

SELECTED ADDRESSES
AND ESSAYS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE REIGN OF RELATIVITY
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM
AND OF OTHER SUBJECTS

THE CONDUCT OF LIFE
AND OTHER ADDRESSES

HUMAN EXPERIENCE
A STUDY OF ITS STRUCTURE

THE PATHWAY TO REALITY

UNIVERSITIES AND NATIONAL
LIFE THREE ADDRESSES TO STUDENTS

HIGHER NATIONALITY
A STUDY IN LAW AND ETHICS

SELECTED ADDRESSES AND ESSAYS

BY

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Preface

SOME desire has been expressed for the publication in a conveniently accessible form of the particular addresses and essays which this little volume contains. They have all appeared before in books or magazines, but they have not been arranged collectively. This has now been done, and, for what they are worth, the contents of this book are now assembled as containing an expression of faith, in knowledge, in higher education, and in a special phase of the unwritten Constitution of the Empire.

HALDANE.

1928.

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The Dedicated Life

IT is your custom to leave to the Rector freedom of choice in the subject of his address. I take this freedom to mean that he may within well-understood limits, turn to the topics that interest him most and to the things that he would fain speak of. With me it has happened that the personal history of the thirty-four years that have passed since I entered this University as an undergraduate has been the story of the growth and deepening of a conviction. It is this conviction that I shall to-day seek to put into words. I shall ask you to bear patiently with me while I strive to express it.

What at present occupies my time is public business ; and it is my daily task, in conducting that business, to remember and to remind others that the end which the State and its members have to strive after is the development of the State. No such development can be genuine unless it stands for

progress in the realization of some great purpose. It is a truism, and yet a much-forgotten truism, to say that such purposes cannot be great if they are narrow. The ends aimed at by those engaged in public affairs must be based on foundations both wide and sure ; but no foundations are wide or sure unless they are such that all the world can be legitimately asked to accept them as foundations. Such a test leaves room for abundance of healthy party difference and criticism, but it insists on that without which there cannot be real stability. The foundation of purpose in the State, through all changes of party policy, must, if the national life is to grow permanently and not diminish, to prosper and not to fade, be ethical. A nation can insist on its just rights and on due respect from other nations, and yet seek to understand and meet their efforts after their own development. A certain cosmopolitanism is of the essence of strength. It is not brute force, but moral power, that commands predominance in the world. This becomes more and more plain as civilization at large progressively emerges from barbarism, and other nations increase in capacity to acquire and to rule. In the result it is the voice of the majority of the States,

of the earth that must determine which of them can be trusted to occupy the foremost places as trustees for the rest. Armaments, of course, tell, but even the most powerfully armed nation cannot in these days hold its own without a certain measure of assent from those around. And perhaps the time is near when armaments will count for so much less than is the case to-day, that they will tend to diminish, and ultimately to become extinct. I am not so sanguine as to believe that the good impulses of even what I firmly believe to be the majority of men will prove the sole or even the proximate influence in bringing this about. The appallingly increased effectiveness of the means of destruction, to which the advancing science of war is yearly adding, and the accompanying increase in the burden of cost, are progressively cogent arguments. The whole system tends to work its way to its own abolition. What can most help and give free scope to this tendency is the genuine acceptance by the nations of a common purpose of deliverance from the burden—a purpose which the necessities of their citizens will surely bring, however slowly, into operation.

It is not, therefore, merely after brute power that a nation can in these days safely

set itself to strive. Leadership among the peoples of the earth depends on the possession of a deeper insight. In national as in private life the power of domination depends on individuality—the individuality that baffles description and much more definition, because it combines qualities that, taken in isolation, are apparently contradictory. Among the States, as among their private citizens, the individuality that is most formidable is formidable because of qualities that are not merely physical. It commands respect and submission because it impresses on those with whom it comes in daily contact a sense of largeness and of moral and intellectual power. Such qualities may, and generally do, carry with them skill in armaments. This, however, is a consequence, and not a cause. It was the moral and intellectual equipment of Greece and Rome that made them world-powers. So it has been with Japan in our own time. And without moral and intellectual equipment of the highest order no nation can to-day remain a world-power. The Turks, who in the sixteenth century were perhaps the most formidable people in Europe, are a case in point.

But if this be so, then the first purpose

of a nation—and especially, in these days of growth all round, of a modern nation—ought to be to concentrate its energies on its moral and intellectual development. And this means that because, as the instruments of this development, it requires leaders, it must apply itself to providing the schools where alone leaders can be adequately trained. The so-called heaven-born leader has a genius so strong that he will come to the front by sheer force of that genius almost wherever his lot be cast, for he is heaven-born in the sense that he is not like other men. But in these days of specialized function a nation requires many leaders of a type less rare—subordinates who obediently accept the higher command and carry it out, but who still are, relatively speaking, leaders. Such men cannot, for by far the greater part, be men of genius; and yet the part they play is necessary, and because it is necessary the State must provide for their production and their nurture. At this point the history of the modern State shows that the University plays an important part. The elementary school raises our people to the level at which they may become skilled workers. The secondary school assists to develop a much smaller but still large class of well-educated citizens.

But for the production of that limited body of men and women whose calling requires high talent, the University or its equivalent alone suffices. Moreover, the University does more. For it is the almost indispensable portal to the career of the highest and most exceptionally trained type of citizen. Not knowledge, not high quality, sought for the sake of some price to be obtained for them, but knowledge and quality for the sake of knowledge and quality are what are essential, and what the University must seek to produce. If Universities exist in sufficient numbers and strive genuinely to foster, as the outcome of their training, the moral and intellectual virtue which is to be its own reward, the humanity which has the ethical significance that ought to be inseparable from high culture, then the State need not despair. For from among men who have attained to this level there will, if there be a sufficient supply of them, emerge those who have that power of command which is born of penetrating insight. Such a power generally carries in its train the gift of organization, and organization is one of the foundations of national strength.

About the capacity to organize I wish to say something before I pass on. It is a gift

of far-reaching significance. It is operative alike in private and in public life, and it imports two separate stages in its application. The first is that of taking thought and fashioning a comprehensive plan, and the second is the putting into operation the plan so fashioned. The success of what is done depends on the thoroughness of the thinking that underlies it. The thought itself is never complete apart from its execution, for in the course of execution it is brought to the test, and may even modify and refashion itself. The most perfect scientific treatise, the most finished work of art, has to a great extent become what it is only in the actual execution. And yet the result has in reality been but the development of what had to be there before the start was made. The greatest statesmen and the greatest generals are those who have adapted their plans to circumstances, and yet the capacity for forming plans in advance has been of the essence of their greatness.

Now, it often happens in organization on a great scale that the work of fashioning the broad features of the plan is done by one man or one set of men, and the work of realizing the ideas so matured by another. For any task that is very great, and must

extend over much time, co-operation is essential. The thinker and the man of action must work in close conjunction, but they need not be, and generally cannot be, the same person, nor need they live at the same time. The history of perhaps the most remarkable case of organization based on culture—the case of Germany in the nineteenth century—is highly suggestive on this point. For the beginning of the story we must turn back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. After the Battle of Jena, Germany was under the heel of Napoleon. From the point of view of brute force she was crushed. In vain she shook at her chains; the man was too strong for her. But there is a power that is greater than that of the sword—the power of the spirit. The world was now to witness the wonderful might of thought. Germany was weak and poor, and she had no Frederick the Great to raise her. But she had a possession that, even from a material standpoint, was to prove of far greater importance to her in the long run. Since the best days of Ancient Greece there had been no such galaxy of profound thinkers as those who were to be found in Berlin, and Weimar, and Jena, gazing on the smoking ruins which Napoleon

of their toil, something that by its very nature as abstract and apart can never be reached. The end is already attained in the striving to realize it. Faust at last discovered happiness at the very end of his career. But it was not an external good reached that made him for the first time exclaim to a passing moment, "Stay, thou art fair!" It was the flashing on his mind of a great truth: "That man alone attains to life and freedom who daily has to conquer them anew." The true leader must teach to his countrymen the gospel of the wide outlook. He must bid them live the larger life, be unselfish, be helpful, be reverent. But he must teach them yet more. He must fill the minds of those who hear him, even of such as are in the depths of national despair, with the sense of the greatness of which human nature is capable.

Such was the lesson taught to downcast Germany at the beginning of last century. It was taught by a succession of great men. The world has hardly before seen a formative influence so powerful brought to bear on the youth of a nation. Its strength lay in the wonderful combination, directed to a common end, of genius of the most diverse kind. In science, in philosophy, in theology,

in poetry, in music, the Higher Command was given and obeyed, and the subordinate leaders, penetrated by great ideas, set to work animated by the same spirit. One notable result was the life which, almost from the first, was breathed into the Universities of Germany. The new ideas dominated them, and they were to remain dominated by these ideas for nearly half a century. Along with a conception of the reality and importance of the State, which was of almost exaggerated magnitude, there grew up the reverent acceptance of the necessity of thought as a preliminary to action. The result was a tendency to organization in every direction, and the rule of the organizing spirit. This took hold as it had never before taken hold of any nation. The great thinkers and their disciples were quick to perceive that if Germany could not, as she was, rival France, with Napoleon as the leader of the French nation, she might yet evolve in course of time a military organization to whose perfection no limit could be set. Scharnhorst and Clausewitz showed the way, and began the work which was to be completed by Moltke and Roon and Bismarck. But it was not to military organization that the German mind turned first

of all. The leaders saw clearly that education was the key to all advance, and they set to work to prepare for the education of the people. The work took sixty years to complete, but completed it was at last, with a thoroughness the like of which the world has hardly seen elsewhere. For again the spirit of organization, of the systematic action which is based on preliminary and systematic thinking, was at work. The German scheme of education stands out to-day as a single whole, containing within itself its three great stages. As a triumph of the spirit of organization it is unrivalled, except by that wonderful outcome of scientific arrangement—the German Army. And the means by which all these things were called into existence and brought about was chiefly the co-operation of the University with the State in producing the men who were to lead and to develop the organization.

Germany is to-day immersed in practical affairs. But she cherishes the educational and military institutions, of which the great figures of the early nineteenth century were the real founders. The development of her technical high schools and of her navy, under the brilliant leadership of the Emperor William II, shows that she has not lost the

faculty which came to her through them. When the lesson of self-organization is once learned by a people, it is not readily forgotten. The habit survives the effort that initiated it. But this has another side, the drawback of which must not be overlooked. Recent German literature points to effects of organization on the history of German life other than those I have spoken of. When a leader of genius comes forward, the people may bow before him, and surrender their wills, and eagerly obey. Such was the response to the great German leaders of thought of a century since. But men like these dominated because they inspired, and lifted those they inspired to a new sense of freedom gained. To obey the commanding voice was to rise to a further and wider outlook, and to gain a fresh purpose. Organization, were it in daily affairs, or in the national life, or in the pursuit of learning, was a consequence and not a cause. But this happy state of things by degrees passed, as its novelty and the original leaders passed away. It revived for a time later in its national aspect under the inspiration of the struggle for German unity and supremacy. But, so far as the lead in the region of pure intellect was concerned, the great pioneers had nearly

all gone by 1832, and the schools of thought which they had founded had begun rapidly to break up. What did remain were the Universities, and these bore on the torch. Yet even the Universities could not avert a change which was gradually setting in. After 1832 the source of the movement ceased for the time to be personality. A great policy had become merged in habit, and was now the routine of the life of the State. As a consequence, the deadening effect of officialdom had begun to make itself felt. To-day in Germany there are murmurs to be heard on many sides about the extent to which the life and freedom of the individual citizen are hemmed in by the State supervision and control which surround him, and which endure almost from the cradle to the grave. The long period of practically enforced attendance at the secondary school for him who seeks to make anything of life; the terror of failure in that leaving examination, to fail in which threatens to end the young man's career; the feeling that the effect on life of compulsory military service cannot be certainly estimated; the State supervision and control of the citizen in later days; all these are leading some Germans to raise the question whether a great policy has not been

pushed forward beyond the limits within which it must be kept, if initiative and self-reliance are not to be arrested in their growth. Where we in this country are most formidable as competitors with the Germans is in our dealings with the unforeseen situations which are always suddenly arising in national life, political and commercial alike. We are trained to depend, not on the State, which gives us, perhaps, too little help, but on ourselves. So it has been notably in the story of our Colonial development. The habit of self-reliance and of looking to nothing behind for support has developed with us the capacity of individual initiative and of rule in uncivilized surroundings in a way which makes some reflecting Germans pause and ask whether all is well with them. They point to our great public schools, and compare them with their own great secondary schools. They are, many of them, asking to-day whether the German gymnasium, with its faultlessly complete system not only of teaching but of moulding youth, really compares altogether favourably with our unorganized Eton and Harrow, where learning may be loose, but where the boys rule themselves as in a small State, and are encouraged by the teachers to do so. Thus,

declare some of the modern German critics, are leaders of men produced and nurtured, with the result that they rule wherever they go, and that when they migrate to distant lands they love their school and their country in a way that is not possible for the German of to-day, who has not in the same fashion known what it is to rely on himself alone.¹

I do not desire either to extol or to detract from the spectacle which our great commercial and political rival on the continent of Europe presents. She has to learn from us, as well as we from her. I would only point to the lesson she has taught us of the value of organization and the part the Universities have played in it. Like all valuable principles, that of the duty to organize may be ridden too hard, but into this danger our national characteristics are not likely to let us fall. But let us turn from the contemplation of these ideals to the actualities of our Scottish University life, and glance at the possibilities which that life affords. You are, most of you, the sons and daughters of parents whose care has been that you should have the higher education. Riches

¹ Cf. Ludwig Gurlitt, *Der Deutsche und sein Vaterland*. Berlin, 1903.

were not theirs. Perhaps a struggle has been necessary in order to give you your chance. Some of the best of you strive hard to lighten the burden and to make yourselves self-supporting. Bursaries and scholarships and employment in private teaching are the aids to which many of you look. Most of you have to content yourselves with necessities and cannot ask for luxuries, nor do the most eminent among you seek these. Learning is a jealous mistress. The life of the scholar makes more demand for concentration than any other life. He who would really live in the spirit of the classics must toil hard to attain that sense of easy mastery of their language which is vital to his endeavour. The mathematician and the physicist who seek to wield the potent instruments of the higher analysis, must labour long and devotedly. To contribute to the sum total of science by original research demands not only many hours of the day spent in the laboratory, but, as a rule, vast reading in addition, and that in several languages. The student of philosophy must live for and think of little else before he can get rid of the habit of unconsciously applying in his inquiries categories which are inapplicable to their subject matter. For he has to learn that

it is not only in practical life that the abstract and narrow mind is a hindrance to progress, and an obstacle in the way to reality.

And as it is with the finished scholar, so it is even with the beginner. He is subject to the same temptations, is apt to be deflected by the same tendencies. Nothing but the passion for excellence, the domination of a single purpose which admits of no foreign intrusion, can suffice for him who would reach the heights. As the older man moulds his life in order that he may pursue his way apart from the distractions of the commonplace, so it is with the best students in the University. They live for their work, and as far as can be, for that alone. They choose their companions with a view to the stimulus of contact with a sympathetic mind. Social intercourse is a means to an end, and that end is the pursuit of the object for which the best kind of student has come to the University. His aim is to grow in mental stature and to enlarge his outlook. This he seeks after quite simply and without affectation, and the reason is that what he aims at is an end in itself, which he follows reverently and with single-minded devotion. I am speaking of men such as I used to observe

daily in this University thirty years ago, and I doubt not—nay, I know—that the breed is not extinct, and that my native Scotland sends to-day to the portals of the old walls just such material as she did a generation since.

In no other way of life, not even in those which witness the busy chase after wealth and political power, is such concentration to be found as is required in the way of life of the genuine-student. Whether he be professor or undergraduate, the same thing is demanded of him. He must train himself away from the idea of spending much time on amusement unconnected with his work. His field of study may be wide ; he may find rest in the very variety of what he is constantly exploring. But the level of effort must ever be high if he is to make the most of the short span of existence. Art is long, and Life is short. The night in which no man can work comes quickly enough to us all. The other day I read some reports which had been procured for me of the fashion in which the Japanese Government had provided for the training of the officers who led their countrymen to victory on the plains and in the passes of Manchuria. There were recorded in these dry official

reports things that impressed me much. In the first place, the Japanese explicitly base the whole of the training which they give to their officers on a very high code of ethics and of chivalry. To learn to obey is a duty as important as to learn to command. The future officer is taken while he is still young, and in his cadet corps the boy who is a born leader is systematically taught to submit to the command of him who may be feeble and even incompetent, but whom he is forbidden to despise. What is aimed at is to produce the sense that it is the corps as a whole for which the individual must live, and, if necessary, die, and that against this corps no individual claim ought to be asserted. Self-effacement, the obligation of truthfulness, devotion to the service of his nation, these are the ethical lessons in which the young Japanese officer is instructed with a thoroughness and a courage which, so far as I know, has no parallel in our time. He must rise early, abstain from luxuries, cultivate the habit of being always busy. Amusements, as such, seem to be unknown in the Japanese officers' school. Recreation takes the shape either of exercises of a kind which are useful for military purposes, or of change of studies. Whether any nation

can continuously produce generation after generation of officers trained up to this high level, I know not. What is certain is that such training has been practised in Japan during this generation. The result is to be found in the descriptions of those who were witnesses of the fashion in which the trenches of the Russians were stormed at Liaoyang and Mukden. I do not quote this case because it illustrates some extreme of the capacity of human nature. On the contrary, this kind of concentration has at all periods of the world's intellectual history been demanded of and freely given by the scholar. We learn from his example that when once the highest motives become operative they prove the most powerful of all. Just as men will die for their religion, so history proves that they will gladly lay their entire lives without reserve on the altar of learning. One sees this much more frequently than is currently realized in the Universities themselves. Youth is the time of idealism, and idealism is the most potent of motives. The student who is conscious that his opportunity has been purchased for him, not merely by his own sacrifices, but by sacrifices on the part of those who are nearest and dearest, has a strong stimulus to that idealism. That

is one of the sources of strength in our Scottish Universities, the Universities of which Edinburgh presents a noble type. I have myself witnessed, in days gone by, individual concentration more intense than even that of the Japanese officer, because it was purely voluntary concentration, and not of action merely, but of spirit. I have known among my personal friends in this University such dedication of life as rivalled the best recorded in the biographies. When the passion for excellence is once in full swing, it knows no limits. It dominates as no baser passion can, for it is the outcome of the faith that can move mountains.

To my mind, the first problem in the organization of a University ought to be how to encourage this kind of spirit. Noble characters are not numerous, but they are more numerous than we are generally aware. In every walk of life we may observe them if we have eyes to see. Such nobility is the monopoly neither of peer nor of peasant. It belongs to human nature as such, and to that side of it which is divine. We may seek for it in the University as hopefully as we may seek for it elsewhere. When once found and recognized, it is potent by its example. Hero-worship is a cult for which

the average Scottish student has large capacity. And so it comes that it is not merely lecture-rooms and laboratories and libraries that are important. The places where those who are busy in the pursuit of different kinds of learning meet and observe each other are hardly less so. The union, the debating society, the talk with the fellow-pilgrim on the steep and narrow way, the friendship of those who are struggling to maintain a high level—these things all of them go to the making of the scholar; and we in the North may congratulate ourselves that they are in reality as open to us as is the case in the Universities of England and of the Continent. If the corporate spirit of the University life is not with us made manifest by as notable signs, it is not the less there. Ideas have been as freely interchanged, and ties between scholars as readily created, with us as in other Universities. The spirit needs but little surrounding for its development; and that little it finds as readily in the solitude of the Braid Hills as on the banks of the Isis or the Cam, in the walks round Arthur's Seat as in the gardens of Magdalen or of Trinity. It rests with those immediately concerned whether their intellectual and social surroundings shall suffice them or

not. Certainly in the Scottish University of to-day there is no lack of either opportunity or provision for the formation of the tastes of the scholar and the habits of the worker. A man may go from these surroundings to devote his life yet more completely to literature, or science, or philosophy, or he may go to seek distinction in a profession or success in commerce. Lucretius has described him who chooses the latter, and prefers the current of the world's rivalry to the scholar's life, in words which still seem to ring in my ears as I recall the figure of a great scholar—William Young Sellar—declaiming them to me and others, his reverent disciples, from the Chair of Humanity in this University many years since, in days when we were still full of youth, and were borne along on the flood tide of idealism. The Roman poet declares that the lot of the man of affairs must be :

*"Errare atque viam palantis quærere vitæ,
Certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
Noctes atque dies niti præstante labore,
Ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri."*

Still, it is not the spirit of haughty contempt which moved Lucretius to these burning and stinging words that should be ours. It is not enough to declare with him that the

scholar finds nothing so sweet as to look down on those engaged in the battle of life, himself securely entrenched within the serene temple of wisdom, and to watch them struggling. Rather does the University exist to furnish forth a spirit and a learning more noble—the spirit and the learning that are available for the service of the State and the salvation of humanity. The highest is also the most real; and it is at once the calling and the privilege of the teacher to convince mankind in every walk of life that in seeking the highest of its kind, they are seeking what is also the most real of that kind. Whatever occupation in life the student chooses, be it that of the study or that of the market-place, he is the better the greater has been his contact with the true spirit of the University. At the very least he will have gained much if he has learned—as he can learn from the scholar alone—the intellectual humility that is born of the knowledge that teaches us our own limits and the infinity that lies beyond. He will be the better man should he perchance have caught the significance of the words with which Plato makes Socrates conclude a famous dialogue: “If, Theætetus, you have a wish to have any more embryo thoughts, they

will be all the better for the present investigation ; and if you have none, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, not fancying that you know what you do not know." For the ends of practice as for those of theoretical study, for skill in the higgling of the market, for the control of great business organizations, for that swift and almost instinctive grasp of the true point which is of the essence of success at the Bar—for these and countless other situations in everyday life the precept of Socrates is of a value which it is difficult to overrate. It is the want of insight of the narrow mind that is the most common reason why apparently well-laid plans get wrecked. The University training cannot by itself supply capacity ; but it can stimulate and fashion talent, and, above all, it can redeem from the danger of contracted views. Thus the University becomes a potent instrument for good to a community, the strength of which is measured by the capacity of the individuals who compose it. The University is the handmaid of the State, of which it is the microcosm—a community in which also there are rulers and ruled, and in which the corporate life is a moulding influence. And so we arrive at the truth, which is becoming

yearly more and more clearly perceived, not here alone, but in other lands, that the State must see to the well-being and equipment of its Universities if it is to be furnished with the best quality in its citizens and in its servants. The veriest materialist cannot but be impressed when he looks around and sees the increasing part which science plays year by year in the struggle of the nations for supremacy. It is true that mere knowledge is not action; but it must not be forgotten that the transition to successful action is nowadays from knowledge, and not from ignorance. Things are in our time too difficult and complicated to be practicable without the best equipment, and this is as much true of public affairs as it is the case in private life.

And now let us pass to yet deeper-going conclusions. If it be the ideal work of the Universities to produce men of the widest minds—men who are fit to lead as well as merely to organize—what must such men set before themselves? The actual is not merely infinite any more than it is merely finite. The merely infinite were perfect, but the eye of man could not behold it. Only in the daily striving to reach them, imperfect as that striving may seem, are life and

freedom accomplished facts. The particular and the universal are not separate existences. Each is real only through the other. It is not in Nature, but as immanent in the self, finite as consciousness discloses that self to be, that we find God ; and so it is that this great truth pervades every relation of life. "He who would accomplish anything must limit himself." The man who would lead others must himself be capable of renouncing. Not in some world apart, but here and now, in the duty, however humble, that lies nearest us, is the realization of the higher self—the self that tends Godward—to be sought. And this carries with it something more. To succeed is to throw one's whole strength into work ; and if the work must always and everywhere involve the passage through the portal of renunciation, be special and even contracted, then the only life that for us human beings can be perfect is the life that is *dedicated*. I mean by the expression a "dedicated life" one that is with all its strength concentrated on a high purpose. Such a life may not seem to him who looks on only from outside to comprise every good. The purpose, though high, may be restricted. The end may never be attained. Yet the man is great, for the quality of his

striving is great. "Lofty designs must close in like effects."

The first duty of life is to seek to comprehend clearly what our strength will let us accomplish, and then to do it with all our might. This may not, regarded from outside, appear to the spectator to be the greatest of possible careers, but the ideal career is the one in which we can be greatest according to the limits of our capacity. A life into which our whole strength is thrown, in which we look neither to the right nor to the left, if to do so is to lose sight of duty—such a life is a dedicated life. The forms may be manifold. The lives of all great men have been dedicated; singleness of purpose has dominated them throughout.

Thus it was with the life of a Socrates, a Spinoza, or a Newton; thus with the lives of men of action such as Cæsar and Cromwell, and Napoleon. We may well see their limits; theirs was the sphere of what is human, the finite. But they concentrated on the accomplishment of a clearly conceived purpose, and worked with their whole strength, and the greatest of them threw that strength into the striving after what was noblest. They may have perished before their end

appeared accomplished in time, and yet they have succeeded. The quality of their work lay in the very striving itself. The end, a profound modern thinker tells us in a great passage, does not wait to be accomplished ; it is always accomplishing itself. " In our finite human life we never realize or see that the end has in truth been reached. The completion of the infinite purpose is thus only the process of removing the illusion that it is not accomplished. The good, the absolutely good, is eternally working itself out in the world, and the result is that it is already there in its perfection, and does not need to wait for us."

The noblest of souls can find full satisfaction for his best aspirations in the sustained effort to do his duty in the work that lies at hand to the utmost that is in him. It is the function of education in the highest sense to teach him that there are latent in him possibilities beyond what he has dreamed of, and to develop in him capacities of which, without contact with the highest learning, he had never become aware. And so the University becomes, at its best, the place where the higher ends of life are made possible of attainment, where the finite and the infinite are found to come together. The wider our

outlook, the more we have assimilated the spirit of the teachers of other nations and other ages than our own, the more will the possibilities of action open to us, and the more real may become the choice of that high aim of man, the dedicated life. We learn so to avoid the unconscious devotion of our energies to that for which we are not fit, and the peril of falling unconsciously into insincerity and unreality of purpose. We learn so to choose the work that is most congenial to us, because we find in it what makes us most keenly conscious that we are bringing into actual existence the best that lies latent in us. The wider outlook, the deeper sympathy, the keener insight, which this kind of culture gives, do not paralyse. They save him who has won them from numberless pitfalls. They may teach him his own limits, and the more he has learned his lesson the more he will realize these limits. But they do not dishearten him, for he has become familiar with the truth that the very essence of consciousness and of life is to be aware of limits and to strive to overcome them. He knows that without limits there can be no life, and that to have comprehended these limits is to have transcended them. As for what lies beyond him he has realized that

it is but as the height in front, which is gained only to disclose another height beyond. He is content with his lot if, and so far as, he feels that in him too, as he seeks with all his strength to bring forth the best that is in him, and at the same time to be helpful to others, God is realizing Himself.

Such, to my mind, is the lesson which it were the noblest function of the ideal University to set forth, and in this fashion can such a University help to give to the world leaders of men, in thought and in action alike. The spirit which it inspires brings with it the calm outlook which does not paralyse human energy, because it teaches that it is quality and not quantity that counts, and that the eternal lies not far away in some other world, but is present here and now. For the man who has learned in this school the common picture of the future life becomes an image that has been raised to correct the supposed inadequate and contingent character of this one; and, as his insight into the deeper meaning of reality in this world grows, so he realizes that his true immortality begins on this side of the grave. To feel himself infinite in his finitude, to learn to accept his closely-bounded life and task as the process in which the side of him that is touched by infinity

becomes real, to be aware of the immanence of the Divine in the humblest and saddest consciousness—this is the lesson which each of us may learn, the secret which the teaching of a true University may unlock for us ; the teaching of a University, but not in the commonplace and restricted sense. In such a school we are instructed in the theoretical meaning of life as we can hardly be elsewhere.

But this is not the only discipline by which we obtain deliverance from the burden of our ignorance, and are led to dedicate ourselves to noble ends. There is a lesson which ought never to be overlooked, and that is the necessity of suppressing the will to live. Before we can command we must learn to obey, and this also a true University life has to teach.

There is innate in the great mass of men and women instinct of obedience to the nature that is higher than their own. In the days in which we live mere rank does not awaken this instinct ; in the Anglo-Saxon race the belief in the divine right of kings has passed away. But even in this forgotten faith we have the spectacle of something that was symbolical of a deeper truth.

Belief in God and submission to His will is the foundation of religion. Belief in the

State as real equally with the individual citizens in whom it is realized and whom it controls, this is the foundation of orderly government. It is not a king as individual, it is a king as the symbol of what is highest in national life that to-day commands loyalty. The instinct of obedience shows itself here, but its real foundation resembles the foundation of that other obedience which is made manifest in the religious life. It is the tendency to bow before the truth, to recognize the rational as the real and the real as the rational. In the main, what is highest will assert its authority with the majority of mankind, and assert it in the end successfully.

What is necessary, and what alone is necessary, is that what is highest should be made manifest, and that for this purpose the mists of ignorance should be dispelled. The more the leader embodies the quality that is great, the wider and more complete will be his ultimate sway. Time may be required, the time that gives birth to opportunity, but the truth will prevail. History, and the history of religion in particular, furnishes us with an unbroken succession of witnesses to this conclusion. A leader may apparently fail, his doctrine may be super-

seded. But if in his period he has represented the best teaching which the Time Spirit could bring forth, his appeal has never been in vain. His victory may not have been complete until after his death. He himself may have been narrow and even fanatical. He may have given utterance to what seems to us, looking back with a larger outlook, to have been but a partial and inadequate expression of the truth. But the history of knowledge is no record of system cast aside and obliterated by what has succeeded it. Rather is the truth a process of development in which each partial view is gradually corrected by and finally absorbed into what comes after it. There may be, as elements in the process, violent revulsions—revulsions to what proves itself in the end to be as one-sided as that which it has superseded. But, taken over a sufficient tract of time, the process of knowledge in the main displays itself as one in which the truth has turned out to be a larger and deeper comprehension of what for the generation before was the best of which that generation was capable. Thus there is at all times a tendency for a new phase of authority to display itself—the authority which rests either on reason or on the instinct that the highest is to be sought

beyond what belongs merely to the moment. And the striving in which this tendency in the end takes shape appears in just a deeper meaning conferred on what is here and now. Sometimes even to a nation the revelation comes suddenly. It wakens from its dogmatic slumber, is wakened perhaps by the sense of impending calamity, and proves at a bound what is the measure of its latent capacity.

So it was with England under Cromwell, with France under Napoleon, with the United States under Washington, with Germany under the great leaders of the intellectual awakening of the nineteenth century. So it has been with Japan, the spectacle of whose new and rapid development has just been unrolled before the eyes of this generation. The awakening has come suddenly in such cases, and that awakening of thought and action has been in response to the Higher Command :

“ There are flashes struck from midnights,
There are fire-flames noondays kindle,
Whereby piled-up honours perish,
Whereby swollen ambitions dwindle,
While just this or that poor impulse
Which for once had played unstifled,
Seems the sole work of a lifetime,
That away the rest have trifled.”

In peace as in war, history displays the irresistible nature of this Higher Command where it really has made itself manifest. He who wields it may be humble. If the divine fire of genius has inspired him, no barrier can hold him from the highest recognition—that recognition which is founded on the popular conviction that, at last, in this particular sphere of thought or of action, the truth has been made evident.

Sometimes—perhaps more often than not—this Command is wielded, too, by no single man. It may take the form of a great doctrine—the foundation of a penetrating faith, inculcated and enforced by a group of leaders in co-operation, no one of whom would have been great enough to be the head of a nation. This was so with Germany at the commencement of the last century, and it would seem to have been so in the recent instance of Japan. The lesson is that, given an inspiring faith, moral or intellectual, and a sufficiency of men imbued with it and fit to teach and to preach it, no nation need languish for want of a single great leader. The Higher Command is there all the same; it is only differently expressed and made manifest. Here, then, it has for long seemed to me, lies the true and twofold function of

the University. It is a place of research, where the new and necessary knowledge is to be developed. It is a place of training, where the exponents of that knowledge—the men who are to seek authority based on it—are to be nurtured and receive their spiritual baptism.

Such a University cannot be dependent in its spirit. It cannot live and thrive under the domination either of the Government or the Church. Freedom and development are the breath of its nostrils, and it can recognize no authority except that which rests on the right of the Truth to command obedience. Religion, art, science—these are, for the body of teachers of the true University type, but special and therefore restricted avenues towards that Truth—many-sided as it is, and never standing still. It was Lessing who declared that were God to offer him the Truth in one hand and the Search for Truth in the other, he would choose the Search. He meant that, just as the Truth never stands still, but is in its nature a process of evolution, so the mind of the seeker after it can never stand still. Only in the process of daily conquering them anew do we, in this region also, gain life and freedom. And it is in the devotion to this search after the

Most High—a search which may assume an infinity of varied forms—that the dedicated life consists; the life dedicated to the noblest of quests, and not to be judged by apparent failure to reach some fixed and rigid goal, but rather by the quality of its striving.

I know no career more noble than that of a life so consecrated. We have each of us to ask ourselves at the outset a great question. We have to ascertain of what we are really capable. For if we essay what it is not given to us to excel in, the quality of our striving will be deficient. But, given the capacity to recognize and seek after what is really the highest in a particular department of life, then it is not the attainment of some external goal—itsself of limited and transient importance—but in earnestness and concentration of effort to accomplish what all recognize to be a noble purpose, that the measure of success lies. So it was with Browning's *Grammarians*. Men laughed at him while he lived. That did not matter. In the end they bowed their heads before him, and when his life was finished laid him to rest in the highest place they knew. For they saw the greatness of spirit of the man who chose what he could best accomplish

limited himself to that, and strove to perfect his work with all his might.

If its Universities produce this spirit in its young men and women, a nation need not despair. The way is steep and hard to tread for those who enter on it. They must lay aside much of what is present and commonly sought after. They must regard themselves as deliberately accepting the duty of preferring the higher to the lower at every turn of daily existence. So only can they make themselves accepted leaders; so only can they aspire to form a part of that priesthood of humanity to whose commands the world will yield obedience.

There is a saying of Jesus with which I will conclude this address, because it seems to me to be, in its deepest interpretation, of profound significance for us, whose concern is for the spirit of this University and for its future influence: "Not every one that saith unto Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of My Father which is in heaven."

Higher Nationality

IT is with genuine pleasure that I find myself among my fellow-lawyers of the New World. But my satisfaction is tempered by a sense of embarrassment. There is a multitude of topics on which it would be most natural that I should seek to touch. If, however, I am to use to any purpose the opportunity which you have accorded me, I must exclude all but one or two of them. For in an hour like this, as in most other times of endeavour, he who would accomplish anything must limit himself. What I have to say will therefore be confined to the suggestion of little more than a single thought, and to its development and illustration with materials that lie to hand. I wish to lay before you a result at which I have arrived after reflection, and to submit it for your consideration with such capacity as I possess.

For the occasion is as rare as it is im-

portant. Around me I see assembled some of the most distinguished figures in the public life of this Continent ; men who throughout their careers have combined law with statesmanship, and who have exercised a potent influence in the fashioning of opinion and of policy. The law is indeed a calling notable for the individualities it has produced. Their production has counted for much in the past of the three nations that are represented at this meeting, and it means much for them to-day.

What one who finds himself face to face with this assemblage naturally thinks of is the future of these three nations, a future that may depend largely on the influence of men with opportunities such as are ours. The United States and Canada and Great Britain together form a group which is unique, unique because of its common inheritance in traditions, in surroundings, and in ideals. And nowhere is the character of this common inheritance more apparent than in the region of jurisprudence. The lawyers of the three countries think for the most part alike. At no period has political divergence prevented this fact from being strikingly apparent. Where the letter of their law is different the spirit is yet the same, and it has been so.

always. As I speak of the historical tradition of our great calling, and of what appears likely to be its record in days to come, it seems to me that we who are here gathered may well proclaim, in the words of the Spartans, "We are what you were, we shall be what you are."

It is this identity of spirit, largely due to a past which the lawyers of the group have inherited jointly, that not only forms a bond of union, but furnishes them with an influence that can hardly be reproduced in other nations. I will therefore venture to look ahead. I will ask you to consider with me whether we, who have in days gone by moulded their laws, are not called on to try in days that lie in front to mould opinion in yet another form, and so encourage the nations of this group to develop and recognize a reliable character in the obligations they assume towards each other. For it may be that there are relations possible within such a group of nations as is ours that are not possible for nations more isolated from each other and lacking in our identity of history and spirit. Canada and Great Britain on the one hand and the United States on the other, with their common language, their common interests, and their common ends,

form something resembling a single society. If there be such a society, it may develop within itself a foundation for international faith of a kind that is new in the history of the world. Without interfering with the freedom of action of these great countries or the independence of their constitutions, it may be possible to establish a true unison between Sovereign States. This unison will doubtless, if it ever comes into complete being, have its witnesses in treaties and written agreements. But such documents can never of themselves constitute it. Its substance, if it is to be realized, must be sought for deeper down in an intimate social life. I have never been without hope that the future development of the world may bring all the nations that compose it nearer together, so that they will progressively cease to desire to hold each other at arm's length. But such an approximation can only come about very gradually, if I read the signs of the times aright. It seems to me to be far less likely of definite realization than in the case of a group united by ties such as those of which I have spoken.

Well, the growth of such a future is at least conceivable. The substance of some of the things I am going to say about its

conception; and about the way by which that conception may become real, is as old as Plato. Yet the principles and facts to which I shall have to refer appear to me to be often overlooked by those to whom they might well appear obvious. Perhaps the reason is the deadening effect of that conventional atmosphere out of which few men in public life succeed in completely escaping. We can best assist in the freshening of that atmosphere by omitting no opportunity of trying to think rightly, and thereby to contribute to the fashioning of a more hopeful and resolute kind of public opinion. For, as some one has said, "L'opinion générale dirige l'autorité, quels qu'on soient les dépositaires."

The chance of laying before such an audience as this what was in my mind made the invitation which came from the Bar Association and from the heads of our great profession, both in Canada and in the United States, a highly attractive one. But before I could accept it I had to obtain the permission of my Sovereign; for, as you know, the Lord Chancellor is also *Custos Sigilli*, the Keeper of that Great Seal under which alone supreme executive acts of the British Crown can be done. It is an instrument he must

neither quit without special authority, nor carry out of the realm. The head of a predecessor of mine, Cardinal Wolsey, was in peril because he was so daring as to take the Great Seal across the water to Calais, when he ought instead to have asked his Sovereign to put it into Commission.

Well, the *Clavis Regni* was on the present occasion put safely into Commission before I left, and I am privileged to be here with a comfortable constitutional conscience. But the King has done more than graciously approve of my leaving British shores. I am the bearer to you of a message from him which I will now read :

"I have given my Lord Chancellor permission to cross the seas, so that he may address the meeting at Montreal. I have asked him to convey from me to that great meeting of the lawyers of the United States and of Canada my best wishes for its success. I entertain the hope that the deliberations of the distinguished men of both countries who are to assemble at Montreal may add yet further to the esteem and goodwill which the people of the United States and of Canada and the United Kingdom have for each other."

The King's message forms a text for what

I have to say, and, having conveyed that message to you, I propose in the first place to turn to the reasons which make me think that the class to which you and I belong has a peculiar and extensive responsibility as regards the future relations of the three countries. But these reasons turn on the position which Courts of Law hold in Anglo-Saxon constitutions, and in entering on them I must recall to you the character of the tradition that tends to fashion a common mind in you and me as members of a profession that has exercised a profound influence on Anglo-Saxon society. It is not difficult in an assemblage of lawyers such as we are to realize the process by which our customary habits of thought have come into being and bind us together. The spirit of the jurisprudence which is ours, of the system which we apply to the regulation of human affairs in Canada, in the United States, and in Great Britain alike, is different from that which obtains in other countries. It is its very peculiarity that lends to it its potency, and it is worth while to make explicit what the spirit of our law really means for us.

I read the other day the reflections of a foreign thinker on what seemed to him the barbarism of the entire system of English

jurisprudence, in its essence judge-made and not based on the scientific foundation of a code. I do not wonder at such reflections. There is a gulf fixed between the method of a code and such procedure as that of Chief-Justice Holt in *Coggs v. Bernard*, of Chief-Justice Pratt in *Armory v. Delamirie*, and of Lord Mansfield when he defined the count for money had and received. A stranger to the spirit of the law as it was evolved through centuries in England will always find its history a curious one. Looking first at the early English Common Law, its most striking feature is the enormous extent to which its founders concerned themselves with remedies before settling the substantive rules for breach of which the remedies were required. Nowhere else, unless perhaps in the law of Ancient Rome, do we see such a spectacle of legal writs making legal rights. Of the system of the Common Law there is a saying of Mr. Justice Wendell Holmes which is profoundly true : " The life of the law has not been logic ; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intentions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to

do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." As the distinguished writer whom I have quoted tells us, we cannot, without the closest application of the historical method, comprehend the genesis and evolution of the English Common Law. Its paradox is that in its beginnings the forms of action came before the substance. It is in the history of English remedies that we have to study the growth of rights. I recall a notable sentence in one of Sir Henry Maine's books. "So great," he declares, "is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has, at first, the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure." I will add to his observation this: that all our reforms notwithstanding, the dead hands of the old forms of action still rest firmly upon us. In logic the substantive conceptions ought of course to have preceded these forms. But the historical sequence has been different, for reasons with which every competent student of early English history is familiar.

The phenomenon is no uncommon one. The time spirit and the spirit of logical form do not always, in a world where the contingent is ever obtruding itself, travel hand in hand. The germs of substantive law were indeed present as potential forces from the beginning, but they did not grow into life until later on. And therefore forms of action have thrust themselves forward with undue prominence. That is why the understanding of our law is, even for the practitioner of to-day, inseparable from knowledge of its history.

As with the Common Law, so it is with Equity. To know the principles of Equity is to know the history of the Courts in which it has been administered, and especially the history of the office which at present I chance myself to hold. Between law and equity there is no other true line of demarcation. The King was the fountain of justice. But to get justice at his hands it was necessary first of all to obtain the King's writ. As Bracton declared, "*non potest quis sine brevi agere.*" But the King could not personally look after the department where such writs were to be obtained. At the head of this, his Chancery, he therefore placed a Chancellor, usually a bishop, but sometimes an arch-

bishop and even a cardinal, for in these days the Church had a grip which to a Lord Chancellor of the twentieth century is unfamiliar. At first the holder of the office was not a judge. But he was keeper of the King's conscience, and his business was to see that the King's subjects had remedies when he considered that they had suffered wrongs. Consequently he began to invent new writs, and finally to develop remedies which were not confined by the rigid precedents of the Common Law. Thus he soon became a judge. When he found that he could not grant a Common Law writ he took to summoning people before him and to searching their consciences. He inquired, for instance, as to trusts which they were said to have undertaken, and as the result of his inquiries rights and obligations unknown to the Common Law were born in his Court of Conscience. You see at a glance how susceptible such a practice was of development into a complete system of Equity. You would expect, moreover, to find that the ecclesiastical atmosphere in which my official predecessors lived would influence the forms in which they moulded their special system of jurisprudence. This did indeed happen; but even in those days the atmosphere was

not merely ecclesiastical. For the Lord High Chancellor in the household of an early English monarch was the King's domestic chaplain, and as, unlike his fellow-servants in the household, the Lord High Steward and the Lord Great Chamberlain, he always possessed the by no means common advantage of being able to read and write, he acted as the King's political secretary. He used, it seems, in early days to live in the palace, and he had a regular daily allowance. From one of the records it appears that his wages were five shillings, a simnel cake, two seasoned simnels, one sextary of clear wine, one sextary of household wine, one large wax candle, and forty small pieces of candle. In the time of Henry II the modern treasury spirit appears to have begun to walk abroad, for in the records the allowance of five shillings appears as if subjected to a reduction. If he dined away from the palace, *si extra domum comederit*, and was thereby forced to provide extras, then indeed he got his five shillings. But if he dined at home, *intra domum*, he was not allowed more than three shillings and sixpence. The advantage of his position was, however, that, living in the palace, he was always at the King's ear. He kept the Great Seal through which all

great acts of state were manifested. Indeed it was the custody of the Great Seal that made him Chancellor. Even to-day this is the constitutional usage. When I myself was made Lord Chancellor the appointment was effected, not by Letters Patent, nor by writing under the Sign Manual, nor even by words spoken, but by the Sovereign making a simple delivery of the Great Seal into my hands while I knelt before him at Buckingham Palace in the presence of the Privy Council.

The reign of Charles I saw the last of the ecclesiastical chancellors. The slight sketch of the earlier period which I have drawn shows that in these times there might well have developed a great divergence of Equity from the Common Law, under the influence of the Canon and Roman laws to which ecclesiastical chancellors would naturally turn. In the old Courts of Equity it was natural that a different atmosphere from that of the Common Law Courts should be breathed. But with the gradual drawing together of the Courts of Law and Equity under lay chancellors the difference of atmosphere disappears, and we see the two systems becoming fused into one.

The moral of the whole story is the hopelessness of attempting to study Anglo-Saxon

jurisprudence apart from the history of its growth and of the characters of the judges who created it. It is by no accident that among Anglo-Saxon lawyers the law does not assume the form of codes, but is largely judge-made. We have statutory codes for portions of the field which we have to cover. But those statutory codes come, not at the beginning, but at the end. For the most part the law has already been made by those who practise it before the codes embody it. Such codes with us arrive only with the close of the day, after its heat and burden have been borne, and when the journey is already near its end.

I have spoken of a spirit and of traditions which have been apparent in English law. But they have made their influence felt elsewhere. My judicial colleagues in the province of Quebec administer a system which is partly embodied in a great modern code, and partly depends on old French law of the period of Louis XIV. They apply, moreover, a good deal of the public and commercial law of England. The relation of the code to these systems has given rise to some controversies. What I have gathered, however, when sitting in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, is that a spirit not very different from that

of the English lawyers has prevailed in Quebec. The influence of the judges in moulding the law, and of legal opinion in fashioning the shape which it should take, seem to me to have been hardly less apparent in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada. Indeed the several systems of our group of nations, however those systems have originated, everywhere show a similar spirit, and disclose the power of our lawyers in creating and developing the law as well as in changing it, a power which has been more exercised outside the legislature than within it. It is surely because the lawyers of the New World have an influence so potent and so easily wielded that they have been able to use it copiously in a wider field of public affairs than that of mere jurisprudence. It is very striking to the observer to see how many of the names of those who have controlled the currents of public opinion in the United States and Canada alike have been the names of famous lawyers. I think this has been so partly because the tradition and spirit of the law were always what I have described, and different from that on the Continent of Europe. But it has also been so because, in consequence of that tradition and spirit, the vocation of the lawyer has not, as on

the Continent of Europe, been that of a segregated profession of interpreters, but a vocation which has placed him at the very heart of affairs. In the United Kingdom this has happened in the same fashion, yet hardly to so great an extent, because there has been competition of other and powerful classes whose tradition has been to devote their lives to a Parliamentary career. But in the case of all three nations it is profoundly true that, as was said by the present President of the United States in 1910, in an address delivered to this very Association, "the country must find lawyers of the right sort and the old spirit to advise it, or it must stumble through a very chaos of blind experiment." "It never," he went on to add, "needed lawyers who are also statesmen more than it needs them now—needs them in its courts, in its legislatures, in its seats of executive authority—lawyers who can think in the terms of society itself."

This at least is evident, that if you and I belong to a great calling, it is a calling in which we have a great responsibility. We can do much to influence opinion, and the history of our law and the character of our tradition render it easy for us to attain to that unity in habit of thought and sentiment

which is the first condition of combined action. That is why I do not hesitate to speak to you as I am doing.

And having said so much, I now submit to you my second point. The law has grown by development through the influence of the opinion of society guided by its skilled advisers. But the law forms only a small part of the system of rules by which the conduct of the citizens of a state is regulated. Law, properly so called, whether civil or criminal, means essentially those rules of conduct which are expressly and publicly laid down by the sovereign will of the state, and are enforced by the sanction of compulsion. Law, however, imports something more than this. As I have already remarked, its full significance cannot be understood apart from the history and spirit of the nation whose law it is. Moreover it has a real relation to the obligations even of conscience, as well as to something else which I shall presently refer to as the General Will of Society. In short, if its full significance is to be appreciated, larger conceptions than those of the mere lawyer are essential, conceptions which come to us from the moralist and the sociologist, and without which we cannot see fully how the genesis of law has

come about. That is where writers like Bentham and Austin are deficient. One cannot read a great book like the *Esprit des Lois* without seeing that Montesquieu had a deeper insight than Bentham or Austin, and that he had already grasped a truth which, in Great Britain at all events, was to be forgotten for a time.

Besides the rules and sanctions which belong to law and legality, there are other rules, with a different kind of sanction, which also influence conduct. I have spoken of conscience, and conscience, in the strict sense of the word, has its own court. But the tribunal of conscience is a private one, and its jurisdiction is limited to the individual whose conscience it is. The moral rules enjoined by the private conscience may be the very highest of all. But they are enforced only by an inward and private tribunal. Their sanction is subjective and not binding in the same way on all men. The very loftiness of the motive which makes a man love his neighbour more than himself, or sell all his goods in order that he may obey a great and inward call, renders that motive in the highest cases incapable of being made a rule of universal application in any positive form. And so it was that the foundation on

which one of the greatest of modern moralists, Immanuel Kant, sought to base his ethical system, had to be revised by his successors. For it was found to reduce itself to little more than a negative and therefore barren obligation to act at all times from maxims fit for law universal, maxims which, because merely negative, turned out to be inadequate as guides through the field of daily conduct. In point of fact that field is covered, in the case of the citizen, only to a small extent by law and legality on the one hand, and by the dictates of the individual conscience on the other. There is a more extensive system of guidance which regulates conduct and which differs from both in its character and sanction. It applies, like law, to all the members of a society alike, without distinction of persons. It resembles the morality of conscience in that it is enforced by no legal compulsion. In the English language we have no name for it, and this is unfortunate, for the lack of a distinctive name has occasioned confusion both of thought and of expression. German writers have, however, marked out the system to which I refer and have given it the name of "Sittlichkeit." In his book, *Der Zweck im Recht*, Rudolph von Jhering, a famous professor at Göttingen, with whose

figure I was familiar when I was a student there nearly forty years ago, pointed out, in the part which he devoted to the subject of "Sittlichkeit," that it was the merit of the German language to have been the only one to find a really distinctive and scientific expression for it. "Sittlichkeit" is the system of habitual or customary conduct, ethical rather than legal, which embraces all those obligations of the citizen which it is "bad form" or "not the thing" to disregard. Indeed regard for these obligations is frequently enjoined merely by the social penalty of being "cut" or looked on askance. And yet the system is so generally accepted and is held in so high regard, that no one can venture to disregard it without in some way suffering at the hands of his neighbours for so doing. If a man maltreats his wife and children, or habitually jostles his fellow-citizen in the street, or does things flagrantly selfish or in bad taste, he is pretty sure to find himself in a minority and the worse off in the end. Not only does it not pay to do these things, but the decent man does not wish to do them. A feeling analogous to what arises from the dictates of his more private and individual conscience restrains him. He finds himself so restrained in the ordinary affairs of daily

life. But he is guided in his conduct by no mere inward feeling, as in the case of conscience. Conscience and, for that matter, law overlap parts of the sphere of social obligation about which I am speaking. A rule of conduct may, indeed, appear in more than one sphere, and may consequently have a twofold sanction. But the guide to which the citizen mostly looks is just the standard recognized by the community, a community made up mainly of those fellow-citizens whose good opinion he respects and desires to have. He has everywhere round him an object-lesson in the conduct of decent people towards each other and towards the community to which they belong. Without such conduct and the restraints which it imposes there could be no tolerable social life, and real freedom from interference would not be enjoyed. It is the instinctive sense of what to do and what not to do in daily life and behaviour that is the source of liberty and ease. And it is this instinctive sense of obligation that is the chief foundation of society. Its reality takes objective shape and displays itself in family life and in our other civic and social institutions. It is not limited to any one form, and it is capable of manifesting itself in new forms and of developing and changing

old forms. Indeed the civic community is more than a political fabric. It includes all the social institutions in and by which the individual life is influenced—such as are the family, the school, the church, the legislature, and the executive. None of these can subsist in isolation from the rest ; together they and other institutions of the kind form a single organic whole, the whole which is known as the Nation. The spirit and habit of life which this organic entirety inspires and compels are what, for my present purpose, I mean by “*Sittlichkeit*.” “*Sitte*” is the German for custom, and “*Sittlichkeit*” implies custom and a habit of mind and action. It also implies a little more. Fichte¹ defines it in words which are worth quoting, and which I will put into English : “What, to begin with,” he says, “does ‘*Sitte*’ signify, and in what sense do we use the word ? It means for us, and means in every accurate reference we make to it, those principles of conduct which regulate people in their relations to each other, and which have become matter of habit and second nature at the stage of culture reached, and of which, therefore, we are not explicitly conscious. Principles, we

¹ *Grundzüge des Gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, Werke, Band vii., p. 214.

call them, because we do not refer to the sort of conduct that is casual or is determined on casual grounds, but to the hidden and uniform ground of action which we assume to be present in the man whose action is not deflected and from which we can pretty certainly predict what he will do. Principles, we say, which have become a second nature and of which we are not explicitly conscious. We thus exclude all impulses and motives based on free individual choice, the inward aspect of 'Sittlichkeit,' that is to say morality, and also the outward side, or law, alike. For what a man has first to reflect over and then freely to resolve is not for him a habit in conduct; and in so far as habit in conduct is associated with a particular age, it is regarded as the unconscious instrument of the Time Spirit."

The system of ethical habit in a community is of a dominating character, for the decision and influence of the whole community is embodied in that social habit. Because such conduct is systematic and covers the whole of the field of society, the individual will is closely related by it to the will and spirit of the community. And out of this relation arises the power of adequately controlling the conduct of the individual. If this power

fails or becomes weak the community degenerates and may fall to pieces. Different nations excel in their "Sittlichkeit" in different fashions. The spirit of the community and its ideals may vary greatly. There may be a low level of "Sittlichkeit"; and we have the spectacle of nations which have even degenerated in this respect. It may possibly conflict with law and morality, as in the case of the duel. But when its level is high in a nation we admire the system, for we see it not only guiding a people and binding them together for national effort, but affording the most real freedom of thought and action for those who in daily life habitually act in harmony with the General Will.

Thus we have in the case of a community, be it the city or be it the State, an illustration of a sanction which is sufficient to compel observance of a rule without any question of the application of force. This kind of sanction may be of a highly compelling quality, and it often extends so far as to make the individual prefer the good of the community to his own. The development of many of our social institutions, of our hospitals, of our universities, and of other establishments of the kind, shows the extent to which it reaches and is powerful. But it

has yet higher forms in which it approaches very nearly to the level of the obligation of conscience, although it is distinct from that form of obligation. I will try to make clear what I mean by illustrations. A man may be impelled to action of a high order by his sense of unity with the society to which he belongs, action of which, from the civic standpoint, all approve. What he does in such a case is natural to him, and is done without thought of reward or punishment ; but it has reference to standards of conduct set up by society and accepted just because society has set them up. There is a poem by the late Sir Alfred Lyall which exemplifies the high level that may be reached in such conduct. The poem is called "Theology in Extremis," and it describes the feelings of an Englishman who had been taken prisoner by Mahometan rebels in the Indian Mutiny. He is face to face with a cruel death. They offer him his life if he will repeat something from the Koran. If he complies, no one is likely ever to hear of it, and he will be free to return to England and to the woman he loves. Moreover, and here is the real point, he is not a believer in Christianity, so that it is no question of denying his Saviour. What ought he to do ? Deliverance is easy, and the relief and advan-

tage would be unspeakably great. But he does not really hesitate, and every shadow of doubt disappears when he hears his fellow-prisoner, a half-caste, pattering eagerly the words demanded.

He himself has no hope of heaven and he loves life—

“ Yet for the honour of English race
May I not live or endure disgrace :
Ay, but the word if I could have said it,
I by no terrors of hell perplexed.
Hard to be silent and have no credit
From man in this world, or reward in the next ;
None to bear witness and reckon the cost
Of the name that is saved by the life that is lost.
I must begone to the crowd untold
Of men by the cause which they served unknown,
Who moulder in myriad graves of old ;
Never a story and never a stone
Tells of the martyrs who die like me
Just for the pride of the old countree.”

I will take another example, this time from the literature of ancient Greece.

In one of the shortest but not least impressive of his *Dialogues*, the “ Crito,” Plato tells us of the character of Socrates, not as a philosopher, but as a good citizen. He has been unjustly condemned by the Athenians as an enemy to the good of the State. Crito comes to him in prison to persuade him to

escape. He urges on him many arguments, his duty to his children included. But Socrates refuses. He chooses to follow, not what anyone in the crowd might do, but the example which the ideal citizen should set. It would be a breach of his duty to fly from the judgment duly passed in the Athens to which he belongs, even though he thinks the decree should have been different. For it is the decree of the established justice of his City State. He will not "play truant." He hears the words, "Listen, Socrates, to us who have brought you up"; and in reply he refuses to go away, in these final sentences: "This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is murmuring in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be vain."

Why do men of this stamp act so, it may be when leading the battle line, it may be at critical moments of quite other kinds? It is, I think, because they are more than mere individuals. Individual they are, but completely real, even as individual, only in their relation to organic and social wholes in which they are members, such as the family, the

city, the State. There is in every truly organized community a Common Will which is willed by those who compose that community, and who in so willing are more than isolated men and women. It is not, indeed, as unrelated atoms that they have lived. They have grown, from the receptive days of childhood up to maturity, in an atmosphere of example and general custom, and their lives have widened out from one little world to other and higher worlds, so that, through occupying successive stations in life, they more and more come to make their own the life of the social whole in which they move and have their being. They cannot mark off or define their own individualities without reference to the individualities of others. And so they unconsciously find themselves as in truth pulse-beats of the whole system, and themselves the whole system. It is real in them and they in it. They are real only because they are social. The notion that the individual is the highest form of reality, and that the relationship of individuals is one of mere contract, the notion of Hobbes and of Bentham and of Austin, turns out to be quite inadequate. Even of an everyday contract, that of marriage, it has been well said that it is a contract to pass out of the sphere of

contract, and that it is possible only because the contracting parties are already beyond and above that sphere. As a modern writer, F. H. Bradley of Oxford, to whose investigations in these regions we owe much, has finely said¹: "The moral organism is not a mere animal organism. In the latter the member is not aware of itself as such, while in the former it knows itself, and therefore knows the whole in itself. The narrow external function of the man is not the whole man. He has a life which we cannot see with our eyes, and there is no duty so mean that it is not the realization of this, and knowable as such. What counts is not the visible outer work so much as the spirit in which it is done. The breadth of my life is not measured by the multitude of my pursuits, nor the space I take up amongst other men; but by the fulness of the whole life which I know as mine. It is true that less now depends on each of us as this or that man; it is not true that our individuality is therefore lessened, that therefore we have less in us."

There is, according to this view, a General Will with which the will of the good citizen is in accord. He feels that he would despise himself were his private will not in harmony

¹ *Ethical Studies*, p. 17

with it. The notion of the reality of such a will is no new one. It is as old as the Greeks, for whom the moral order and the city state were closely related ; and we find it in modern books in which we do not look for it. Jean Jacques Rousseau is probably best known to the world by the famous words in which he begins the first chapter of the *Social Contract*: "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Those who think themselves to be the masters of others cease not to be greater slaves than the people they govern." He goes on in the next paragraph to tell us that if he were only to consider force and the effects of it, he would say that if a nation was constrained to obey and did obey, it did well ; but that whenever it could throw off its yoke and did throw it off, it acted better. His words, written in 1762, became a text for the pioneers of the French Revolution. But they would have done well to read further into the book. As Rousseau goes on we find a different conception. He passes from considering the fiction of a Social Contract to a discussion of the power over the individual of the General Will, by virtue of which a people becomes a people. This General Will, the *Volonté Générale*, he distinguishes from the *Volonté de Tous*, which

is a mere numerical sum of individual wills. These particular wills do not rise above themselves. The General Will, on the other hand, represents what is greater than the individual volition of those who compose the society of which it is the will. On occasions this higher will is more apparent than at other times. But it may, if there is social slackness, be difficult to distinguish from a mere aggregate of voices, from the will of a mob. What is interesting is that Rousseau, so often associated with doctrine of quite another kind, should finally recognize the bond of a General Will as what really holds the community together. For him, as for those who have had a yet clearer grasp of the principle, in willing the General Will we not only realize our true selves but we may rise above our ordinary habit of mind. We may reach heights which we could not reach, or which at all events most of us could not reach, in isolation. There are few observers who have not been impressed with the wonderful unity and concentration of purpose which an entire nation may display—above all, in a period of crisis. We see it in time of war, when a nation is fighting for its life or for a great cause. We have seen it in Japan, and we have seen it still more recently even

among the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula. We have marvelled at the illustrations with which history abounds of the General Will rising to heights of which but few of the individual citizens in whom it is embodied have ever before been conscious even in their dreams.

In his life of Themistocles, Plutarch tells us how even in time of peace the leader of the Athenian people could fashion them into an undivided community and inspire them to rise above themselves. It was before the Persians had actually threatened to invade Attica that Themistocles foresaw what would come. Greece could not raise armies comparable in numbers to those of the Persian kings. But he told his people that the oracle had spoken thus: "When all things else are taken within the boundary of Cecrops and the covert of divine Cithaeron, Zeus grants to Athena that the wall of wood alone shall remain uncaptured, which shall help thee and thy children." The Athenian citizens were accustomed in each year to divide among themselves the revenue of their silver mines at Laurium. Themistocles had the daring, so Plutarch tells us, to come forward and boldly propose that the usual distribution should cease, and that they should let him

spend the money for them in building a hundred ships. The citizens rose to his lead, the ships were built, and with them the Greeks were able at a later date to win against Xerxes the great sea-fight at Salamis, and to defeat an invasion by the hosts of Persia which, had it succeeded, might have changed the course of modern as well as ancient history.

By such leadership it is that a common ideal can be made to penetrate the soul of a people, and to take complete possession of it. The ideal may be very high, or it may be of so ordinary a kind that we are not conscious of it without the effort of reflection. But when it is there it influences and guides daily conduct. Such idealism passes beyond the sphere of law, which provides only what is necessary for mutual protection and liberty of just action. It falls short, on the other hand, in quality of the dictates of what Kant called the Categorical Imperative that rules the private and individual conscience, but that alone, an Imperative which therefore gives insufficient guidance for ordinary and daily social life. Yet the ideal of which I speak is not the less binding; and it is recognized as so binding that the conduct of all good men conforms to it.

Thus we find within the single State the

evidence of a sanction which is less than legal but more than merely moral, and which is sufficient, in the vast majority of the events of daily life, to secure observance of general standards of conduct without any question of resort to force. If this is so within a nation, can it be so as between nations? This brings me at once to my third point. Can nations form a group or community among themselves within which a habit of looking to common ideals may grow up sufficiently strong to develop a General Will, and to make the binding power of these ideals a reliable sanction for their obligations to each other?

There is, I think, nothing in the real nature of nationality that precludes such a possibility. A famous student of history has bequeathed to us a definition of nationality which is worth attention: I refer to Ernest Renan, of whom George Meredith once said to me, while the great French critic was still living, that there was more in his head than in any other head in Europe. Renan tells us that "Man is enslaved neither by his race, nor by his language, nor by the direction of mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation." Another acute critic of life, Mat-

threw Arnold, citing one still greater than himself, draws what is in effect a deduction from the same proposition. "Let us," he says,¹ "conceive of the whole group of civilized nations as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working towards a common result; a confederation whose members have a due knowledge both of the past, out of which they all proceed, and of each other. This was the ideal of Goethe, and it is an ideal which will impose itself upon the thoughts of our modern societies more and more."

But while I admire the faith of Renan and Arnold and Goethe in what they all three believed to be the future of humanity, there is a long road yet to be travelled before what they hoped for can be fully accomplished. Grotius concludes his great book on War and Peace with a noble prayer: "May God write," he said, "these lessons—He Who alone can—on the hearts of all those who have the affairs of Christendom in their hands. And may He give to those persons a mind fitted to understand and to respect rights, human and divine, and lead them to recollect always that the ministration

¹ *Preface to the Poems of Wordsworth.*

committed to them is no less than this, that they are the Governors of Man, a creature most dear to God."

The prayer of Grotius has not yet been fulfilled, nor do recent events point to the fulfilment as being near. The world is probably a long way off from the abolition of armaments and the peril of war. For habits of mind which can be sufficiently strong with a single people can hardly be as strong between nations. There does not exist the same extent of common interest, of common purpose, and of common tradition. And yet the tendency, even as between nations that stand in no special relation to each other, to develop such a habit of mind is in our time becoming recognizable. There are signs that the best people in the best nations are ceasing to wish to live in a world of mere claims, and to proclaim on every occasion "Our country, right or wrong." There is growing up a disposition to believe that it is good, not only for all men but for all nations, to consider their neighbours' point of view as well as their own. There is apparent at least a tendency to seek for a higher standard of ideals in international relations. The barbarism which once looked to conquest and the waging of successful war as the main

object of statesmanship, seems as though it were passing away. There have been established rules of International Law which already govern the conduct of war itself, and are generally observed as binding by all civilized people, with the result that the cruelties of war have been lessened. If practice falls short of theory, at least there is to-day little effective challenge of the broad principle that a nation has as regards its neighbours' duties as well as rights. It is this spirit that may develop as time goes on into a full international "Sittlichkeit." But such development is certainly still easier and more hopeful in the case of nations with some special relation, than it is within a mere aggregate of nations. At times a common interest among nations with special relations of the kind I am thinking of gives birth to a social habit of thought and action which in the end crystallizes into a treaty, a treaty which in its turn stimulates the process that gave it birth. We see this in the case of Germany and Austria, and in that of France and Russia. Sometimes a friendly relationship grows up without crystallizing into a general treaty. Such has been the case between my own country and France. We have no convention excepting one confined

to the settlement of old controversies over specific subjects, a convention that has nothing to do with war. None the less, since in that convention there was embodied the testimony of willingness to give as well as to take, and to be mutually understanding and helpful, there has arisen between France and England a new kind of feeling which forms a real tie. It is still young, and it may stand still or diminish. But equally well it may advance and grow, and it is earnestly to be hoped that it will do so.

Recent events in Europe and the way in which the Great Powers have worked together to preserve the peace of Europe, as if forming one community, point to the ethical possibilities of the group system as deserving of close study by both statesmen and students. The "Sittlichkeit" which can develop itself between the peoples of even a loosely connected group seems to promise a sanction for International Obligation which has not hitherto, so far as I know, attracted attention in connection with International Law. But if the group system deserves attention in the cases referred to, how much more does it call for attention in another and far more striking case!

In the year which is approaching, a century

will have passed since the United States and the people of Canada and Great Britain terminated a great war by the Peace of Ghent. On both sides the combatants felt that war to be unnatural and one that should never have been commenced. And now we have lived for nearly a hundred years, not only in peace, but also, I think, in process of coming to a deepening and yet more complete understanding of each other, and to the possession of common ends and ideals, ends and ideals which are natural to the Anglo-Saxon group, and to that group alone. It seems to me that within our community there is growing an ethical feeling which has something approaching to the binding quality of which I have been speaking. Men may violate the obligations which that feeling suggests, but by a vast number of our respective citizens it would not be accounted decent to do so. For the nations in such a group as ours to violate these obligations would be as if respectable neighbours should fall to blows because of a difference of opinion. We may disagree on specific points and we probably shall, but the differences should be settled in the spirit and in the manner in which citizens usually settle their differences. The new attitude which is growing up has changed many things,

and made much that once happened no longer likely to recur. I am concerned when I come across things that were written about America by British novelists only fifty years ago, and I doubt not that there are some things in the American literature of days gone past which many here would wish to have been without. But now that sort of writing is happily over, and we are realizing more and more the significance of our joint tradition and of the common interests which are ours. It is a splendid example to the world that Canada and the United States should have nearly four thousand miles of frontier practically unfortified. As an ex-War Minister, who knows what a saving in unproductive expenditure this means, I fervently hope that it may never be otherwise.

But it is not merely in external results that the pursuit of a growing common ideal shows itself when such an ideal is really in men's minds. It transforms the spirit in which we regard each other, and it gives us faith in each other—

“Why, what but faith, do we abhor
And idolise each other for—
Faith in our evil or our good,
Which is or is not understood
Aright by those we love or those
We hate, thence called our friends or foes.”

I think that for the future of the relations between the United States on the one hand and Canada and Great Britain on the other, those who are assembled in this great meeting have their own special responsibility. We who are the lawyers of the New World and of the old mother country possess, as I have said to you, a tradition which is distinctive and peculiarly our own. We have been taught to look on our system of justice, not as something that waits to be embodied in abstract codes before it can be said to exist, but as what we ourselves are progressively and co-operatively evolving. And our power of influence is not confined to the securing of municipal justice. We play a large part in public affairs, and we influence our fellow-men in questions which go far beyond the province of the law, and which extend in the relations of society to that "Sittlichkeit" of which I have spoken. In this region we exert much control. If, then, there is to grow up among the nations of our group, and between that group and the rest of civilization, a yet further development of "Sittlichkeit," has not our profession special opportunities of influencing opinion, which are coupled with a deep responsibility? To me, when I look to the history of our calling in

the three countries, it seems that the answer to this question requires no argument and admits of no controversy. It is our very habit of regarding the law and the wider rules of conduct which lie beyond the law as something to be moulded best if we co-operate steadily, that gives us an influence perhaps greater than is strictly ours, an influence which may in affairs of the State be potently exercised for good or for evil.

This, then, is why, as a lawyer speaking to lawyers, I have a strong sense of responsibility in being present here to-day, and why I believe that many of you share my feeling. A movement is in progress which we, by the character of our calling as judges and as advocates, have special opportunities to further. The sphere of our action has its limits, but at least it is given to us as a body to be the counsellors of our fellow-citizens in public and in private life alike. I have before my mind the words which I have already quoted of the present President of the United States, when he spoke of "lawyers who can think in the terms of society itself." And I believe that if, in the language of yet another President, in the famous words of Lincoln, we as a body in our minds and hearts "highly resolve" to work for the

general recognition by society of the binding character of international duties and rights as they arise within the Anglo-Saxon group, we shall not resolve in vain. A mere common desire may seem an intangible instrument, and yet, intangible as it is, it may be enough to form the beginning of what in the end will make the whole difference. Ideas have hands and feet, and the ideas of a congress such as this may affect public opinion deeply. It is easy to fail to realize how much an occasion like the assemblage in Montreal of the American Bar Association, on the eve of a great international centenary, can be made to mean, and it is easy to let such an occasion pass with a too timid modesty. Should we let it pass now, I think a real opportunity for doing good will just thereby have been missed by you and me. We need say nothing ; we need pass no cut-and-dried resolution. It is the spirit, not the letter, that is the one thing needful.

I do not apologize for having trespassed on the time and attention of this remarkable meeting for so long, or for urging what may seem to belong more to ethics than to law. We are bound to search after fresh principles if we desire to find firm foundations for a progressive practical life. It is the absence

of a clear conception of principle that occasions some at least of the obscurities and perplexities that beset us in the giving of counsel and in following it. On the other hand, it is futile to delay action until reflection has cleared up all our difficulties. If we would learn to swim, we must first enter the water. We must not refuse to begin our journey until the whole of the road we may have to travel lies mapped out before us. A great thinker declared that it is not Philosophy which first gives us the truth that lies to hand around us, and that mankind has not to wait for Philosophy in order to be conscious of this truth. Plain John Locke put the same thing in more homely words when he said that "God has not been so sparing to men to make them two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational." Yet the reflective spirit does help, not by furnishing us with dogmas or final conclusions, or even with lines of action that are always definite, but by the insight which it gives, an insight that develops in us what Plato called the "synoptic mind," the mind that enables us to see things steadily as well as to see them whole.

And now I have expressed what I had in my mind. Your welcome to me has been

indeed a generous one, and I shall carry the memory of it back over the Atlantic. But the occasion has seemed to me significant of something beyond even its splendid hospitality. I have interpreted it, and I think not wrongly, as the symbol of a desire that extends beyond the limits of this assemblage. I mean the desire that we should steadily direct our thoughts to how we can draw into closest harmony the nations of a race in which all of us have a common pride. If that be now a far-spread inclination, then indeed may the people of three great countries say to Jerusalem, "Thou shalt be built," and to the Temple, "Thy foundation shall be laid."

The Conduct of Life

I HAVE chosen a theme on which I should not have ventured had I not in days gone by been one of yourselves, and intimately acquainted with the ups and downs which beset those who were then struggling along the path to a degree.

My recollection of my undergraduate life forty years since, and of the obscurities and perplexities of that time, is still vivid ; and with your permission I wish to speak to-day of how some of the old difficulties appear to one looking back on them with the light which experience of life has brought.

Before I enter on my topic, I may just refer to a difference that in such a meeting as this distinguishes the present from the past. I touch the topic not without trepidation, but I will take my life in my hands. I am to-day addressing women just as much as men. For a change has come over the University since my time, a change of which

I have the temerity to say at once that I am glad. Women have an access to academic life which in my student days was practically denied to them. And this is a sign of the times. It is a part of a movement which is causing the world slowly to alter its point of view, and which is, I think, making for the principle of general equality, in the eye of the law and the constitution, of women with men. The differences of temperament and ability which nature has established even an omnipotent Parliament can never alter. But Society, whatever Parliament may say, appears to be making progress towards a decision to leave it to nature and not law to set the limits. It is therefore obvious that in what I have to say before a University which is full of the spirit of the age, I must speak to all of you without much regard to your sex. And if I divine aright the mood of those of the gentler sex here present, they will not take it amiss if I address all who are present as though they were men.

Well, hastening away from this merely introductory point, let me relieve your minds by saying that it is my purpose neither to indulge in introspection, nor to betake myself to the region of reminiscence. It is not

the past that interests me. I wish rather to speak of aspects of life which at one period in it are very much the same for most of us. These aspects of life present themselves irresistibly when we enter the University. It is then that we students become anxious about many things. These things include, for some at all events, the outlook on existence and doubt about its meaning. Then there is concern as to the choice of a career, and as to success in it or failure. There is the sense of new responsibilities which press themselves on us as we enter upon manhood, and the feeling that everything is difficult and illusive. We may be troubled about our souls, or again, we may be keenly concerned as to how we can most quickly become self-supporting and cease to be a burden on others ill able to bear it. All these topics, and others besides of a less high order, crowd on the undergraduate as he finds that he has parted with his irresponsible boyhood, and has to think for himself. He feels that he can no longer look to others for guidance. He knows that he must shape his own destiny and work out his own salvation. The situation has its special temptations. He is in danger of some evils against which the Prophets have warned us all, and especially

of a morbid concentration on his own private concerns, a concentration that is apt to result in a self-consciousness which may amount to egotism and impair his strength :

"The man," Wordsworth tells us, "whose eye
Is ever on himself doth look on one,
The least of Nature's works,—one who might move
The wise man to that scorn which wisdom holds
Unlawful ever."

Now from this danger every one of us, young or old, has got to guard himself. In life we are subject to all sorts of reverses, great and small. There is only one way of providing against the depression which they bring in their train, and that is by acquiring the large outlook which shows that they are not the most important things in life. The undergraduate may find himself ploughed in an examination, or in debt, or for that matter, and do not let us overlook its possibility, hopeless in a love affair. Or he may suffer from the depression which is deepest when it arises from no external cause. If he would escape from the consequent sense of despair he must visualize his feelings and set them in relief by seeking and searching out their grounds. It is probably his best chance of deliverance. For these feelings often turn out on resolute scrutiny to arise from the

obsession of his own personality. This obsession may assume varied forms. It may become really morbid. There is a remarkable book by a modern man of genius, one whom Nietzsche and Ibsen both held in high esteem—the *Inferno* of August Strindberg—where you may read with advantage if you would be warned against a self-concentration that verges on the insane. There is another and better-known book, which in my time at the University was much read, and which is, I think, still much read, Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*. There you have an analysis of the very process of deliverance of which I am speaking. The hero works out his own relief from the burden of his own depression. It is not exclusively a Christian book; indeed I doubt whether in his heart Carlyle called himself a Christian. But it exhibits certain features of the way by which, in substance and in reality, men are required by all the greatest religions to seek their salvation. These features Carlyle describes in his pictorial fashion. Teufelsdröck, weighed down by depression, but never wholly losing courage, is one hot day toiling along the Rue St. Thomas de l'Enfer, when the light flashes on him, and he puts to himself this:—"What art thou afraid of

... Hast thou not a heart; canst thou not suffer whatever it be; and as a Child of Freedom, though outcast, trample Tophet itself under thy feet, while it consumes thee." Then through his soul, Carlyle tells us, rushed a stream of fire, and he shook fear away from him for ever. The Everlasting No had said, "Behold thou art fatherless, outcast, and the Universe is mine (the Devil's)"; to which his whole Me made answer—"I am not thine, but Free, and forever hate thee." Later on, the diagnosis of his malady becomes clear to him. The source of the disease of his spirit has been vanity and the claim for happiness. This he has now been taught to do without. For he has learned that the fraction of life can be increased in value, not so much by increasing the numerator as by lessening the denominator. He finds, indeed, that unity itself divided by zero will result in infinity: Let him make his claim of wages a zero, and he has the world under his feet. For it is only with renunciation that the world can be said to begin. He must, as Carlyle puts it, close his Byron and open his Goethe. He must seek blessedness rather than happiness—love not pleasure but God. "This is the Everlasting Yea, wherein all contradiction

is solved ; wherein who walks and works it is well with him."

That was what Carlyle used to teach us students forty years ago, and I doubt not that he teaches the same spiritual lesson to many of you to-day. It is not, as I have already said, in form the language of Christianity. None the less, it substantially agrees with much in the doctrine of the Gospels. It gives us, in Carlyle's particular style, the highest spiritual expression at the highest level that man has reached. The form matters little. Every one must express to himself these things in the fashion that best suits his individuality. It is a question of temperament and association. Yet we all assent in our hearts, whatever be the form of our creed, to such doctrine, whether it be given in the words of the Founder of Christianity or of modern thinkers. Professor Bosanquet worked it out in a new shape in the Gifford Lectures which he delivered in this University last year. There he sought to exhibit the world as a "vale of soul-making," to use the phrase which he borrowed from Keats, in which the soul reached most nearly to perfection by accepting without hesitation, the station and the duties which the contingencies of existence had assigned to it,

and by striving to do its best with them. Looked at in the light that comes from the Eternal within our breasts, the real question was not whether health or wealth or success were ours. For the differences in degree of these were but droplets in the ocean of Eternity. What did matter, and what was of infinite consequence, was that we should be ready to accept with willingness the burden and the obligation which life had cast on us individually, and be able to see that in accepting it, hard as it might be to do so, we were choosing a blessedness which meant far more for us than what is commonly called happiness could. We should rather be proud that the burden fell to us who had learned how to bear it. It thus, I may add by way of illustration of Mr. Bosanquet's words, was no sense of defeat, no meaningless cry of emotion, which prompted Emily Brontë when she defined her creed :

" And if I pray the only prayer
That moves my lips for me,
Leave me the heart that now I bear
And give me liberty :
Yes, as my swift days near their goal,
'Tis all that I implore,
In life and death a chainless soul,
With courage to endure."

There is a passage in the fifth of the

second series of these Gifford Lectures which expresses the other aspect of this great truth :

“ If we are arranging any system or enterprise of a really intimate character for persons closely united in mind and thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of the whole—persons not at arm’s length to one another—all the presuppositions of individualistic justice at once fall to the ground. We do not give the ‘ best ’ man the most comfort, the easiest task, or even, so far as the conduct of the enterprise is concerned, the highest reward. We give him the greatest responsibility, the severest toil and hazard, the most continuous and exacting toil and self-sacrifice. It is true and inevitable, for the reasons we have pointed out as affecting all finite life, that in a certain way and degree honour and material reward do follow on merit in this world. They follow, we may say, mostly wrong ; but the world, in its rough working, by its own rough-and-ready standards, thinks it necessary to attempt to appraise the finite individual unit ; this is, in fact, the individualistic justice, which, when we find it shattered and despised by the Universe, calls out the pessimism we are discussing. But the more intimate and spiritual is the

enterprise, the more does the true honour
and reward restrict itself to what lives

" In those pure eyes
And perfect witness of all judging Jove."

I am probably addressing at this moment some of you who have come to our University of Edinburgh from the great but far distant country of India. There your wisest and greatest thinkers have expressed a similar truth in a similar way. Some of your best teachers of Eastern philosophy have lately been among us and have spoken to us in Great Britain. The response of their hearers has been a real one. For the greatest sayings about the meaning of life come to the same thing, however and wherever they have been uttered. Perhaps nowhere more than in the East has the language of poetry and philosophy been wonderfully combined. This blending of Art with Thought has enabled master minds to shake themselves free of the narrowing influence of conventional categories, and has thereby made philosophy easier of approach. The thinkers of the East have been keenly aware of the chilling influence of the shadow of self. I will cite to you some words from the *Gitanjali* of a prominent and highly-gifted leader of opinion, Rabin-

dranath Tagore, who has been recently preaching and teaching in this country:

"I came out alone on my way to my tryst. But who is this that follows me in the silent dark? I move aside to avoid his presence, but I escape him not. He makes the dust rise from the earth with his swagger; he adds his loud voice to every word that I utter. He is my own little self, my lord, he knows no shame; but I am ashamed to come to the door in his company. . . .

"Prisoner, tell me, who was it that bound you? It was my master, said the prisoner. I thought I could outdo everybody in the world in wealth and power, and I amassed in my own treasure-house the money due to the King. When sleep overcame me I lay on the bed that was for my lord, and on waking up I found I was a prisoner in my own treasure-house. Prisoner, tell me who it was that wrought this unbreakable chain. It was I, said the prisoner, who forged this chain very carefully. I thought my invincible power would hold the world captive, leaving me in a freedom undisturbed. Thus night and day I worked at the chain with huge fires and cruel hard strokes. When at last the work was done, and the links were

complete and unbreakable, I found that it held me in its grip."

What is the lesson of it all? It is that you must aim at the largest and widest view of life, and devote your highest energies to attaining it. This view of life, with its sustaining power, will come to you if you strive hard enough, in one form or another, according to temperament, intellectual and moral. To some it will come in the form of Christianity, to others in that of some other high religion, it may be one originating in the East. To yet others it will come in more abstract form, in the shape of philosophy. To yet others Art will bring the embodiment of the truth that the ideal and the real, the infinite and the finite, do not really exist apart, but are different aspects of a single reality. Such a faith, if it comes, will, as the experience of countless thousands in different ages has shown, help you in sickness or in health, in poverty or in wealth, in depression or in exaltation. Only this faith must be a real faith. No mere opinion, still less mere lip service, can supply its place. It necessitates renunciation of the lower for the higher, and the renunciation must be a real renunciation—extending, if need be, to life itself. "Life itself is not the

highest good": "Das Leben ist der Güter höchstes nicht," says Schiller in the end of a great poem. The line became at one time deeply familiar to the students at Heidelberg, because of an incident which was dramatic in its suddenness. One of their great teachers, Daub, the theologian, at the end of a lecture sank dead in his professor's chair with these words of Schiller on his lips.

In my time we were troubled about our orthodoxy more, I think, than you are to-day. It was in the Victorian period, a period in which we seemed to be bidden to choose between the scientific view of life and the religious view. We were told by high authorities that both could not be true, and that we must make our election. But the outlook has widened since those days, and you have a greater freedom of choice. Men of science have seen their conceptions subjected to searching examination and criticism. Whether they hold with M. Bergson, or whether they hold with the Idealists, or whether they pledge themselves to no philosophy, but simply aim at believing in all the phases of the world as it presents itself, the best equipped investigators no longer jump to the assumption that the Universe is a substance existing wholly independently of

mind, and organized in relations that are limited to those of mechanism. We look nowadays to mind for the interpretation of matter, rather than to matter as the *prius* and source of mind. We seek for God, not without, but within. And this attitude is reflected in that of the Church. For the Church no longer sets up in pulpits the sort of spiritualism which was little else than a counter-materialism to that of the men of science. The preachers are less exclusively concerned with the old and crude dogmas, and are more occupied with the effort to raise the thought and feeling of their hearers to a level higher than that of the ordinary abstractions of science and of everyday life itself. And so it has come about that you to-day are delivered from some at least of the perplexities which beset us, your predecessors, as we walked on the Braid Hills and endeavoured to find spiritual ground on which we could firmly plant our feet. The hindrances to spiritual life are to-day of a different order. They are moral rather than intellectual. They arise more from a lessened readiness to accept authority of any kind than was the case two generations ago. But at least your task is freed from a set of obstacles which in those days were serious.

You may find it hard to take the same interest in the letter of the creeds as we did. But the spirit remains the same, under whatever form religion attracts you, and the spirit is to-day more easy of approach and provokes less readily to rebellion.

What I would urge upon you is that you should avoid the practice, one that is not uncommon among young men, but is really unnatural, of affecting indifference or cynicism about these things. They are of the last importance, and it is of practical importance to have the habit of so regarding them. For without them but few will be steeled against the misfortunes of which life is full for nearly all of us, and the depressing uncertainties which render its conduct difficult. To those who are worth most there comes home early in life the conviction that, in the absence of a firm hold on what is abiding, life becomes a poorer and poorer affair the longer it lasts. And the only foundation of what is abiding is the sense of the reality of what is spiritual—the constant presence of the God who is not far away in the skies, but is here within our minds and hearts.

That is what I wished to say to you about what seems to me the deepest-lying and most

real fact of life. I now turn to quite another phase of the question of its conduct. How is the student, with or without the supreme source of strength of which I have spoken, to prepare himself so that he will have the best chances of success? To me this question does not seem a difficult one to answer. I have seen something of men and of affairs. I have observed the alternations of success and failure in various professions and occupations. I have myself experienced many ups and downs, and in the course of my own life have made abundant mistakes. It always interests me to look back and observe in the light of later and fuller knowledge how I came to fail on particular occasions. And the result of the scrutiny has been to render it clear that the mistakes and failures would nearly always have been avoided had I at the time been possessed of more real knowledge and of firmer decision and persistence. We all, or nearly all, get a fair number of chances in life. But we often do not know enough to be able to take them, and we still more often pass them by, unconscious that they exist. Get knowledge and get courage. And when you have come to a deliberate decision, then go ahead, and go ahead with grim and unshakable resolution to persist.

It is not every one who can do this. But every one can improve his quality in this respect. It is partly matter of temperament, but it is also largely matter of acquired habit of mind and body. You can train yourself to increased intellectual and moral energy as you can train yourself for physical efficiency in the playing-field. Both kinds of training turn largely on self-discipline, abstinence, and concentration of purpose, following on a clear realization of exactly what it is that you have set yourself to accomplish. But there is an insidious temptation to be avoided. Few things disgust his fellow-men more, or render them more unwilling to help him, than self-seeking or egotism on the part of a man who is striving to get on. A thoroughly selfish fellow may score small successes, but he will in the end find himself heavily handicapped in the effort to attain really great success. Selfishness is a vice, and a thoroughly ugly one. When he takes thought exclusively of himself, a man does not violate only the canons of religion and morality. He is untrue to the obligations of his station in society, he is neglecting his own interests, and he will inevitably and quickly be found out. I have often watched the disastrous consequences of this sin, both

in private and in public life. It is an insidious sin. It leads to the production of the hard small-minded man, and, in its milder form, of the prig. Both are ill-equipped for the final race; they may get ahead at first; but as a rule they will be found to have fallen out when the last lap is reached. It is the man who possesses the virtue of true humility, and who thinks of his neighbours, and is neither critical nor a grumbler if they have good fortune, who has his neighbours on his side, and therefore in the end gets the best chance, even in this world, assuming always that he puts his soul into his own work. Therefore avoid the example of poor Martha. Her sister Mary loved to sit at the feet of Jesus and to hear His word. The burden of the household work, doubtless, for the time fell rather heavily on Martha. Instead of being cheerful and glad at what had come to her sister she got into a complaining mood. She was cumbered about with much serving, and she grumbled: "Lord, dost thou not care that my sister hath left me to, serve alone?" But the Master answered, "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things. But one thing is needful, and Mary has chosen that good part." There are a good many

Marthas in our Universities, and they belong to both sexes. How common it is to hear grudging praise given, and the student complaining of the better luck which has given undue advantage to his neighbour. Now, there may be undue advantage in circumstances, and there often is. But according to my experience it makes far less difference in the long run than is popularly supposed. What does make the difference is tenacity of purpose. A man succeeds in four cases out of five, because of what is in him, by unflagging adhesion to his plan of life, and not by reason of outside help or luck. It is rarely that he need be afraid of shouldering an extra burden to help either himself or a neighbour. The strain it imposes on him is compensated by the strength that effort and self-discipline bring. And therefore the complaints of our Marthas are mainly beside the point. They arise from the old failing of self-centredness—the failing which has many forms, ranging from a mild selfishness up to ego-mania. And in whatever form the failing may clothe itself, it produces weakness.

There is another aspect germane to it about which, speaking to you as one who has seen a good deal of affairs and of the world,

I wish to say something. Independence of character is a fine thing, but we are apt to mistake for it what is really want of consideration for others. If we do not impose on ourselves a good deal of self-restraint we may readily jar on other people. We may be unconscious of the jarring manner. That is very common. But it ought to be avoided. It is worth the while of every one, and from every point of view, that of his own worldly interest included, to practise himself in the social virtue of courtesy and urbane manners. But it is more than a social virtue. In its best form it arises from goodness of heart. Some of the finest manners I have met with I have met with in cottages, because there I have found some of the most considerate of people. Courtesy is an endowment which men can acquire for themselves, and it is an endowment which is well worth acquiring. I have, to put its utility at its lowest, seen many instances of gifted men ruining their chances of getting on in life simply from want of manners. It is well worth while to try to act naturally and without self-consciousness, and above all, kindly. That is how dignity is best preserved. Some men have a natural gift for it. All ought to try to acquire it. Emerson has written an admir-

able essay on manners which I advise you all to read. "Defect in manners," he says, "is usually defect in fine perceptions." He, like Goethe, laid great stress on urbanity and dignity. These two great critics of life were both keenly aware of what injustice people do to themselves and to their prospects in life by not attending to the graces, which in their best form come from goodness of heart and the fine perceptions which accompany that goodness. It makes a great difference to ourselves if we are careful in considering the feelings and repugnances of other people in small things as well as in great. Let us try to be too large-minded to resent an apparent want of consideration for ourselves which really comes, in most cases, from defective manners in those with whom we may have to deal. Let us accept what comes to us undisturbed. Given the same qualities, a man will be stronger as well as better, and will have more power of influencing circumstances as well as other people, if he is resolute in accepting without complaint what comes to him, and remembers the duties of his station in life, and thinks of others as much as of himself. It was something of this sort, I think, that Cromwell really had in his mind when he

said to Bellievre, the French Ambassador, that "no man rises so high as he who knows not whither he is going." No doubt Cromwell thought also of the great gift of the objective mind, the mind that has no illusion, because it always turns to a great purpose, and is not deflected by its consciousness of self. But what he said applies to a less unusual type of mind just as much. It is the man who accepts his obligation to those around him, and who does his work in his station in life, great or small, whatever that station may be, with indifference as to the consequence to himself and without thought of what may happen to him individually, who makes the real impression on his fellow-competitors. First, think it all out to the best of your ability, and then go straight forward on the principles and with the objects on which you have fixed, looking neither to the right nor to the left. Your principles and your objects must be high—the higher the better. And when you have grasped them resolve to hold to them tenaciously and over a long period. It matters less whether you have hit initially on the plan that is theoretically perfect than whether you throw yourself into it unswervingly and stick to it with all your might. Unswerving

purpose and concentration are of the last importance. Stick to plans once formed, and do not let yourself think of changing them unless for the clearest reasons. It is firmness and persistence that bring success in the end probably more than anything else. You may be beaten at first ; you may have to wait. But the courage that is undaunted and can endure generally at last prevails.

When my relative and predecessor in the office of Lord Chancellor, John Scott, Lord Eldon, was asked what was the real way to ensure for young men success at the Bar, he replied : " I know no rule to give them but that they must make up their minds to live like a hermit and work like a horse." He had himself, in a notable fashion, put his precept into practice. But here again I must utter a word of warning about the precept of my distinguished relative. The rule of practice which I have quoted from him I believe to be indispensable, whatever career you choose. But in carrying it into effect you must guard against the temptation to become what is called too practical, that is to say, narrow and uninteresting. Youth, with its elasticity and boundless energy, is the time to lay the foundations of wide

knowledge and catholic interests. The wider and more catholic these are the better, provided that they do not distract you from the necessary concentration on your special object. They need not do so. Time is infinitely long for him who knows how to use it, and the mind is not like a cubic measure that can contain only a definite amount. Increase, therefore, wherever you can, without becoming amateurs in your own calling, the range of your interests. Every man and woman is, after all, a citizen in a State. Therefore let us see to it that there is not lacking that interest in the larger life of the social whole which is the justification of a real title to have a voice and a vote. Literature, philosophy, religion, are all widening interests. So is science, so are music and the fine arts. Let every one concern himself with these or such of them as he thinks can really appeal to him. So only will his outlook be wide enough to enable him to fill his station and discharge his duties with distinction. He ought to be master of much knowledge besides that of his profession. He must try to think greatly and widely. So only will he succeed if he is called to the higher vocations where leadership is essential. For there is a lower class,

a middle class, and an aristocracy of intelligence. The lower class may do some things better than the intellectual aristocrat. I have known Senior Wranglers who would have been below par as bank clerks. Again, there is a large class of skilled work, some of it requiring long training and even initiative, which is done better by competent permanent officials than by statesmen even of a high order. But when we come to the highest order of work it is different. There is a common cry that this, too, should be left to the expert. There is no more complete misinterpretation of a situation. The mere expert, if he were charged with the devising and execution of high aims and policy, would be at sea among a multitude of apparently conflicting considerations. What is the relation of a particular plan to a great national policy and to far-reaching principles and ends? Questions like these must always be for the true leader and not for the specialist. But if the former is wise, as soon as he has made up his mind clearly as to what he wants, he will choose his expert and consult him at every turn, and entrust him freely with the execution of a policy for which he himself will remain responsible. Such a course requires capacity of a high kind, and

the widest sort of knowledge. But without it success is impossible. No man can know or do everything himself, and the great man of affairs always knows how and what to delegate. The procedure of such men in their work is instructive as to other and less responsible situations. They are never overwhelmed with that work, because their knowledge and their insight enables them to sift out what they themselves must do, and to entrust the rest freely to picked subordinates. For the spirit that is necessary to develop this gift in the higher callings in life, the wide outlook, the training in which can be commenced in the University better than anywhere else, is of vital importance. Whether a man is to be teacher, or doctor, or lawyer, or minister of religion, it is width of outlook that for most men in the end makes the difference. Of course for genius there is no rule, and great natural talent of the rarer order can also dispense with much. But I wish to say to you emphatically that it is just here and now, in your student years, that you make yourselves what you will be, and that you are, nearly all of you, most responsible for your failure or success in later life. It is not that I think a purely intellectual life something of which every-

thing else must fall short ; far from it. You have only to read the Gospels to find the conclusive demonstration that this is not so. But I do think that the atmosphere of intelligence is the atmosphere where the inner life, whatever it may be, most completely expands and culminates.

Bacon, in his essay on "Studies," uses some words which we do well to bear in mind if we would keep our sense of proportion : "Studies," he says, "serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief use for delight is in privateness and retiring ; for ornament is in discourse ; and for ability is in the judgment and disposition of business. For expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of, particulars one by one. But the general counsels and the plots and marshalling of affairs come best from those that are *learned*. To spend too much time in studies is sloth. To use them too much for ornament is affectation ; to make judgment wholly by their rules is the humour of a scholar. They perfect nature and are perfected by experience." They perfect nature, for they provide an atmosphere in which natural gifts grow and expand. They are perfected by experience, because their gaps are filled up by what we can learn in practical

life alone, and the life of theory and the life of practice by reacting on and penetrating each other, form a truly proportioned entirety. The strength of men like Cromwell, like Napoleon, like Lincoln and like Bismarck, is their grasp of great principles and their resoluteness in carrying them into application. For even where great men have not been of the scholar class they have been under the domination of beliefs which rested on a foundation of principle and were inspired to the extent of becoming suffused by passion. And without passion nothing great is or ever has been accomplished. I do not mean by passion violent or obvious emotion. I mean the concentration which gives rise to singleness of purpose in forming and executing great plans, and is, in fact, a passion for excellence. And if this exists enough in you to bring you into leadership of any kind at the University it will probably again bring you into leadership later on in life, provided always that you select your line of action with prudence and hold to it undeviatingly.

I have not said to you anything particularly new or much that you have not often heard before in different words. But I did not come here to say new things. The obvious is what is generally neglected. I have come

here as an old student to speak to students who are not yet old, and to act the part of a friend by trying to point out the character of the road ahead of them, and the places that are difficult. It is because I have traversed some of these difficult places myself that I have not hesitated to speak to you. It is so that we can most readily be helpful to each other. I have no longer a great number of years to look forward to, but I have a great many to look back upon. And I am myself an old *alumnus* of this University who remembers well the days when he would have given a good deal to know the real experience and conclusions of those who had gone before him along the road he had to follow.

This is what I would say to you in conclusion. It is not true that with the increase of numbers and competition life offers fewer prizes in proportion to the multitude who are now striving for them. With the progress of science and the advance in the complicated processes of specialization and distribution of function, there are arising more and more openings, and more and more chances for those who aspire to succeed in the competition which exists everywhere. I believe that the undergraduates whom I see

before me have better prospects than existed forty years ago. There are far more possible ways of rising. But the standards are rising also, and high quality and hard work are more than ever essential. The spread of learning has had a democratic tendency. Those who are to have the prizes of life are chosen on their merits more than ever before. It must, however, always be borne in mind that character and integrity count in the market-place among these merits as well as do knowledge and ability. For the man who possesses both capacity and character, and who, having selected his path, sticks to his plan of life undeviatingly, the chances of success seem to me to-day very great. But wisdom means more than attention to the gospel of getting on. Life will at the end seem a poor affair if the fruits of its exertions are to be no more than material acquisitions. From the cradle to the grave it is a course of development, and the development of quality as much as quantity ought to continue to the last. For it is in the quality of the whole, judged in all its proportions and in the outlook on the Eternal which has been gained, that the test of the highest success lies, the success that is greatest when the very greatness of

its standards brings in its train a deep sense of humility. That was why Goethe, in a memorable sentence, said something with which I will conclude this address: "The fashion of this world passes away, and it is with what is abiding that I would fain concern myself."

The Civic University

YOUR University has done me the honour of choosing me for its Chancellor. I have asked leave to express in person before you, the citizens of Bristol, my gratitude for this high distinction. Such title as I possess to it is that I have cared for the cause of University Education in the great cities of the kingdom. I have believed in this cause and have striven for it. And it is with a sense of real pleasure that I find myself privileged to be closely associated with the new University life of your community.

Of this new life I wish to say something to you on the present occasion. It is a characteristic development of our time that the great cities of England should have asked for, and in rapid succession obtained, the concession of their own Universities. In Scotland, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen have for centuries possessed such Universities, to the great profit of themselves and the Scottish

nation. Dundee has recently followed their example by entering into fellowship with St. Andrews. In Ireland, Dublin has lately got a second teaching University, and Belfast has secured a University of her own. In England the progress has recently been rapid—London made her foundation of a teaching University under the Act of 1898. Birmingham followed suit, and was herself quickly followed by Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, and Sheffield, and then by Bristol. Newcastle has recognized the example of Dundee by entering into partnership with Durham.

There were not wanting those who took a gloomy view of the new development. The standard of University life and of University degrees must, they said, inevitably be ruined. The level of Oxford and Cambridge could never be reached, and these old Universities might even be damaged. To this it was replied that no one aimed at an imitation of Oxford and Cambridge. These Universities possessed an historical tradition of their own which was a great asset to the country. No wise person would wish to alter their special atmosphere. They could, after all, provide for only a limited number of students; what had to be provided for elsewhere was the

very much larger number whom they did not reach. It was pointed out that Germany possessed a greater number of Universities in proportion to her population than we did, and that there were certainly no grounds for saying that their number had either lowered the standard of University education in that country, or that Berlin or Munich or Leipzig or Breslau afforded the least indication that a University could not flourish exceedingly in a great city. Moreover, experience had shown that the very competition of Universities tended to bring about a stingless rivalry in keeping standards high. These arguments prevailed with Governments and Parliaments. But the victory was not won without a struggle. What was probably the final battle was fought out in the end of 1902 before a very impressive tribunal, in the form of a Special Committee of the Privy Council. I make no apology for referring to this battle of the experts, for by some chance even historians of education in this country seem to know little of it. Liverpool had by 1902 awakened to the sense of her necessities, and, stimulated by the success of Mr. Chamberlain's effort for Birmingham, had petitioned for a University Charter. She possessed a University College. She was sure she could develop

this greatly in both money and men if the city felt that it was considered worthy to have a University of its own, instead of a College federated with those of Manchester and Leeds under the Examining Board at Manchester, which then possessed the title of the Victoria University. She complained that the federal system was subordinating education to examination, instead of putting examination in its proper place as a means to the end of testing teaching—that teaching which ought to be the supreme object of the existence of a University. Manchester, a little half-heartedly, concurred in the Liverpool view; Leeds opposed strongly, and was backed up by a mixed but powerful assemblage of witnesses, which included some opponents of what were nicknamed Lilliputian Universities, and by some advocates of external examination. The petition of Liverpool was referred by the Crown to a Committee of the Privy Council, and eminent lawyers argued the case for and against it and called their witnesses. The Committee was presided over by the distinguished statesman who was then President of the Council, the late Duke of Devonshire, and he had as his colleagues Lord Rosebery, the ex-Prime Minister, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, who was

then Secretary for Scotland, Lord James of Hereford, and one whom we in Bristol know well, and hold in admiration and affection, Sir Edward Fry. The hearing occupied three days: the 17th, 18th, and 19th of December, 1902. The Committee after deliberation reported, and an Order in Council, dated the 10th of February, 1903, gave effect to the report. It was pronounced that Liverpool and Manchester had made out their case for the grant of University Charters. It was added that the step of granting the Charters involved issues of great moment which should be kept in view, and for the solution of which due preparations should be made, especially in respect to those points upon which, having regard to the great importance of the matter, and the effects of any changes upon the future of higher education in the North of England, co-operation was expedient between Universities of a common type and with cognate aims.

The date of this Order in Council is, I think, a memorable one. It gave State recognition to a new policy, but for which we might not have been assembled here to-night. The principle was accepted that the number of the English Universities was to be increased, and their headquarters were to

be in cities. The conditions were that the chief responsibility was to be entrusted to the cities themselves, and that the cities should be large enough and keen enough to ensure that the requisite local resources for the maintenance and development of the Universities should be forthcoming. It is about the Civic University which has thus been born that I have come to speak to you. Such a University presupposes for its existence not only sympathy but enthusiasm on the part of the citizens. Without such enthusiasm it cannot grow or become a source of credit and advantage, moral, intellectual, or material, to the city. But such experience as we have had shows the city, by taking thought in this fashion, in process of adding a cubit to its stature. The other thing needful is that the education given should be of the very highest type practicable. It must not be merely technical or designed as a means to material ends. That is a narrow aim which in the end defeats its own accomplishment. The appeals to the King in Council, on the great occasion to which I have alluded, breathed a wholly different spirit. It was then declared that the great communities of the kingdom would be content with nothing short of the highest. They had,

of course, to make a beginning ; they could not accomplish everything at once—University institutions can only obtain their full stature as the result of long growth. But the mediæval cities of Italy, cities such as Bologna, had set to the world a great example. They found a home, as students of books such as that of Dr. Rashdall on the Universities of the Middle Ages know, for guilds of students, who established themselves there to the great fame and profit of the city. They became conscious of their own individuality, and they assisted in giving to the world University teaching and University work of the highest kind. What, to go still further back, did not Athens owe to the fact that the highest learning was developed and put by the people themselves in the highest place among Athenian institutions ? Such ancient cities are a model for us ; they influenced not only their own countrymen but the whole world for good. The chance has come to us in England to accomplish something of the same kind, and with us, as with them, it is to the enthusiasm and resources of our great urban communities, never, when once convinced, wanting in faith, that we have to look.

There was a time when men of business,

accustomed to see closely to profit and loss, used to think that the work of a University was worth effort and expenditure only in so far as it produced aptitude for industrial and commercial production. Traces of this view are still apparent in the foundation deeds of some of the older University Colleges of our municipalities. But this idea is now discredited, and the part played by science and by general learning in the production alike of the captain of industry and of the extension of invention is far greater than was the case even a few years ago. Applied science is in its best form only possible on a wide foundation of general science. And the fruitful scientific spirit is developed to-day on a basis of high intellectual training, the training which only the atmosphere of the fully developed University can completely provide. What is true of science in the narrower sense is also true of learning generally. It is only by the possession of a trained and developed mind that the fullest capacity can, as a general rule, be obtained. There are, of course, exceptional individuals with rare natural gifts which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are indeed rare. We are coming more and more to recognize that the best specialist can be produced only after a long

training in general learning. The grasp of principle which makes detail easy can only come when innate capacity has been evoked and moulded by high training. Our engineers, our lawyers, our doctors, our administrators, our inventors, cannot keep in front in the race, or hold their own amid the rivalry of talent, unless their minds have been so widely trained that the new problems with which the ever-increasing complications and specializations of modern conditions confront them, present nothing more formidable than new applications of first principles which have been thoroughly assimilated. Without having reached this level they cannot maintain their feet. The competition is not merely with their fellow-countrymen ; it is with the trained minds of other countries. These other countries are, some of them, advancing at least as rapidly as we are. An enlightened policy in education is the order of the day over most of the civilized world, and if we are to hold our own, even in the making of money, we dare not fall behind or lag in the endeavour to increase our efforts. I see no sign that we Britons are diminishing one whit in our really great capacity. In many respects, notably in certain of our public institutions, we are advancing so rapidly that

we continue to lead the way, and our production of wealth is not falling off. Moreover, I do not believe that we are really losing what is equally necessary—the spirit of respect to the laws which we have made for ourselves that has been one of our chief glories. But we have more than ever before to see to it that we keep at least abreast in science, and science means far more now than technical training, or the mere application of special knowledge to industry. It rests on a foundation of general culture which is vital to the maintenance of its standards, and it can develop only if the population has the fullest chance of an intellectual and moral training which goes deeper than mere science strictly so called. It is the power of the highly-trained mind that is required, and the full development of this trained mind can only be given by the highly organized Universities.

This brings me to my next point. It is said that it is only the comparatively few that can attain to this level. That is quite true. And it is neither requisite nor possible that every one should be trained up to it. If we had all the Universities in the world concentrated in England, we should find that it was only a limited percentage of the

population which would be fitted by natural aptitude to take full advantage of them. What is really essential is that every one should have a chance, and that there should be the nearest possible approach to equality of educational opportunity. Without this the sense of injustice will never be eliminated, and we shall in addition fail to secure for our national endeavours the help of our best brains. There is sitting at the present time an important Royal Commission. The Civil Service, which is the permanent element in the government of the country, has been recruited in various ways. The prevailing but not the only test has been examination. The civil servants are, however, divided into higher and lower divisions. The lower division, which is much the larger, does the great bulk of the routine and less difficult work. Its members enter by competitive examination at the age of about eighteen. They spend but a short time, as a rule, in the secondary school, which they leave early to prepare for the examination. The higher division, which is much smaller, consists of those who succeed in a competitive examination, passed when they are about twenty-two. For the most part they have started at a University, the object being to secure candidates who have

had the benefit of a full University training, and, if possible, such as have taken honours. After appointment they do work which is, some of it, of a highly responsible character, requiring both general education and the capacity of taking the initiative and of managing men. In my opinion this is a most valuable type of public servant. I was the head, for over six years, of a great administrative department, and I formed the opinion that this class of men, with a broad general foundation of education of the higher type, was essential in the interests of the State, and, after all, the consideration to be placed foremost. But the mode of election has given rise to dissatisfaction. It is felt, and felt rightly, that a very large class is shut out from any chance of entry, and that the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge have had an undue advantage. They continue to fill a very large proportion of the vacancies. The fact that this is because Oxford and Cambridge until now have proved to be the best training places for the candidates is not altogether an answer to the complaint. Education quite as good for the purpose might be given elsewhere. But such education, to be sufficient, must be of a high order. After a good deal of observation, both while

I was at the Bar and while I was in charge of an administrative department, I have come to the conclusion that, as a general rule, the most stimulating and useful preparation for the general work of the higher Civil Service is a literary training, and that of this a classical education is for most men the best form, though not exclusively so. No doubt men vary, and science or modern literature may develop the mind, in the case of those who have aptitude for them, better than Latin or Greek literature. But, as Goethe said long ago, the object of education ought to be rather to form tastes than simply to communicate knowledge. The pedant is not of much use in the conduct of public affairs. For the formation of tastes and of the intellectual habits and aptitudes which the love of learning produces, the atmosphere of a highly organized University life is a tremendous power, and we cannot do without it. And, therefore, while I am not without sympathy with the complaint of democracy that the entrance to the higher positions in the Civil Service is by far too much the monopoly of a class, I reply that a highly educated official is essential for a particular kind of work which the State needs. The remedy must not be to displace the class

which alone furnishes the supply. Democracy is apt in its earlier stages to be unduly jealous, and to try to drag things down to a level which, because it is the general level, is in danger of being too low to provide the highest talent. The remedy for what is a real grievance appears to me to be that democracy should add a new plank to its platform and insist on equality of opportunity in education as something that should be within the reach of every youth and maiden. That more than a comparatively small minority will prove capable of taking advantage of the highest education is unlikely. We are not all born with the same capacity. But that many will seize on a new opportunity who are at present shut out, is to my mind certain. And if democracy will abandon the suggestion that the highest work can be done without the highest educational preparation for it, I shall be the most whole-hearted supporter of the inauguration of a new democratic campaign. There are those who possess the inborn initiative and capacity which can do without the ordinary educational avenues. They have existed at all times and they exist to-day. They must be taken into account and provision made for them by special promotion. But these

are nature's aristocrats, and the number of true aristocrats is always very small. We have to legislate for the ordinary man and woman, and we cannot do more than make provision for that equality of opportunity in the higher education of which I have spoken.

Elementary education is now the right of all, and since the passing of the Education Act of 1902, an Act the immense advantages of which have always appeared to me to outweigh certain awkward blemishes which have still to be got rid of, the clever boy or girl can generally, by means of a scholarship or a free place, get to the secondary school. But the chances for the poor scholar to get from the secondary school to the University, although they exist, are still far too few. The Labour leaders are quite right when they complain that the prizes of the State are in reality far too much reserved for the upper classes. Where they are wrong, I think, is in the remedy they propose. The State will suffer badly if the level of its civil servants is lowered, and it will be lowered if the qualifications for all positions are reduced to the educational equipment possessed by a youth who has ceased his studies at eighteen. The true remedy is to break down the class

barrier by making provision for enabling the youth of eighteen to go on, if he is fit to do so, and to qualify himself more highly. Now here is where the Civic University has a great part to play. It is idle to say, as is sometimes said, that Oxford and Cambridge include the democracy. Theoretically they do, but not one child of the people out of a thousand has a real chance of becoming an undergraduate there. More accessible Universities are required, and these new Universities, I am careful to add, will only successfully compete with Oxford and Cambridge in serving the requirements of the State if they keep their level very high. A University to be a true University must be a place where the spirit is more important than the letter. In the elementary schools, and to a great extent even in the secondary schools, the teacher is in a position of authority. What he says is accepted by the pupil as truth without inquiry. But in a true University, where the problems are higher and more difficult, the professor as well as his student is making his voyage of discovery. Both must avoid dogmatic slumber or even supineness. They must in all reality investigate—and be content to investigate. This inevitable feature of the higher work, even where it is primarily

educational, has always been recognized by those whose names we reverence most. Lessing meant it when he declared almost passionately that if the Almighty were to offer him the truth in one hand and the search after the truth in the other, he would choose the hand that held the search after truth. It is this that Goethe had in mind when he said what I have already quoted about the real object of education being to form tastes and not to impart knowledge. Of course, knowledge must be imparted. But it comes fully to those and to those alone who are able to realize its necessity and to desire it with all their souls for its own sake, and not as a means to any end. As Aristotle long ago declared, the foundation of wisdom is the awakening of the sense of wonder. The spirit of the University is thus the co-operation of professor and student in a common endeavour to learn. The former is further on than the latter and can impart to him stimulation and guidance. But they are both searchers after truth, and the dominance of the letter over the spirit, which is of necessity more present in the school, ought to be remote from both. A University is a place where the most valuable advantage the student has is contact with an inspiring personality.

That is why nothing short of the best level among the professors is enough for success. The professor must inspire. His labour must be one of love if he is to succeed. And if he is a great teacher he will have moulded the lives and tastes of the best of his students for the rest of their existence.

Here, then, is a new object of ambition for you, the citizens of Bristol. You have it in your power now, if you so choose, to make it possible for the son or daughter of every poor man in this city, be he high or be he low, to attain to this splendid advantage in life. Only few can be chosen ; that results from the fact that the order of nature does not permit us to be born equal. But the many may and ought to be called, even if the few are chosen. Let us turn to the practical application to the affairs of your city of this great gospel of educational opportunity. Those who believe in democracy have not yet awakened to its significance. When they do they may come to think that here lies the most direct path to the attainment of their end.

Your elementary schools are excellent, and are still improving ; all children must go to them. When they leave they are apt to

forget what they have learned. The working classes are growing more keen about keeping their children on at the schools instead of taking them away to earn money. They endure a heavy burden to do this, and I sometimes think that one of the reasons for the growth of a discontent which has somewhat of the divine in it, is a sense of the growing burden of the indirect cost of education. Any rise in wages is balanced and more than balanced by the rise in standards of living, and this is true not only of England but of most other highly civilized countries. Even, however, if the child stays on to fourteen, it leaves school only to forget much. I used, when I was at the War Office, to be struck by the comparatively large percentage of soldiers who could not read or write. The Education Acts had been in force since 1870, and the fact at first sight seemed difficult to understand. The explanation was that the young soldiers had learned to read and write, but had left school and forgotten, so that we had to educate them over again.

Now in Bristol you have a good proportion of excellent secondary schools. The boy or girl can in many cases get there from the elementary school. But not in all cases, nor

in enough of cases. And when I turn to the further chance of the University, the same thing is true, and true in a more marked form. There are chances offered to clever young men and women of reaching your University: But there are not enough of such chances for the establishment of anything like the standard of equality in educational opportunity. It is the attainment of this standard, this high and true ideal, that I wish to-night to commend to the citizens of Bristol without distinction of rank or occupation. The inhabitants of this great city are all of them directly interested in it. To possess in Bristol a real system of graduated education, within the reach of all who are endowed by nature with the talent to take advantage of it, would make Bristol the first city in the Empire as regards education, for it would have what the other cities do not now possess. And it would mean much for this city as regards other things. The experience of our own nation, and perhaps still more that of other countries, has shown the power of expansion and influence which a complete system of education can give. The most important result is not money-making. But even in money-making, in these days when science and organization are becoming dominating

influences in commercial undertakings, success seems certain to depend more and more as time advances on their possession. And therefore I appeal to all of you, to workmen and employers, to the man who can just manage to educate his children and to the wealthiest alike, to concern yourselves in a great civic cause. Do not let yourselves be influenced by the criticism that is sometimes made even to-day by those whose ideas about University influence are entirely derived from the contemplation of the older Universities. No one is more keenly conscious than I am that there has grown up around Oxford and Cambridge an atmosphere which it is impossible to reproduce elsewhere. It has been the growth of the tradition of centuries. It has developed the finest qualities in scholarship. But, as a detached observer, I must add that this atmosphere and the habits which it has developed in us have hindered as well as helped.

When Francis Bacon wrote his *Advancement of Learning*, and was laying the foundations of his great discoveries in inductive logic and scientific method, he turned sharply on the teaching of the English Universities. At one of them, Cambridge, he had been a distinguished student. Yet his biographers tell

us that while he was "commorant" at the University at the age of sixteen, he "first fell into dislike of the philosophy of Aristotle, not for the worthlessness of the author, to whom he would ever ascribe all high attributes, but for the unfruitfulness of the way, which seemed to him only strong for disputations and barren of the production of works for the life of man." It was not that he disliked the University system; on the contrary in the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon says: "We highly approve of the education of youth in colleges, and not wholly in private houses or schools, for in colleges there is not only a greater emulation of youth among their equals, but the teachers have a venerable aspect and gravity, which greatly conduces towards insinuating a modest behaviour, and the forming of tender minds from the first, according to such example, and besides these there are many other advantages of a collegiate education." From various passages in the *Advancement* we gather that his condemnation arose from the unintelligent fashion in which the Dons of his time taught abstract rules to those who had not yet gathered what he calls, quoting Cicero rather oddly, "'Sylva' and 'Supellex,' and then Matter and Fecundity." To begin with these

rules is, he declares, as though one were "to paint or measure the wind."

Now in the *Advancement of Learning* my great predecessor in the office of Lord Chancellor was hardly just to Aristotle. We have at last learned to understand Aristotle's words because we have been at pains to understand his thoughts. Aristotle's logical methods were not what Bacon took them to be. They were far more searching and much nearer to the truth about the processes of acquiring knowledge. But it is one of the great reproaches against the English Universities that they dragged the name of Aristotle down into the mud. Their verbal scholarship left little to be desired. But they stretched Greek thought, that of Plato hardly less than that of Aristotle, on the rack of their own provincial ideas, until the vitality had disappeared out of it. It was not until less than fifty years ago that any decent exposition of the philosophy of Aristotle was produced at an English University. In September, 1866, the late T. H. Green, a great thinker, wrote an article on the subject in the *North British Review*, in which he made a new departure for Oxford, and raised the study of Aristotle to a higher plane by showing that his metaphysics and his logic must be read as one whole, and in

the light which modern idealism had cast on them. It was not through Locke and Berkeley and Hume alone that Aristotle and Plato could be made intelligible. The study of other modern thinkers was an essential preliminary. When we consider that the first edition of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* appeared in 1781, it is not creditable to the English Universities that, in a subject of which their teachers were never tired of discoursing, they should have remained for eighty-five years in ignorance of the only method of penetrating its real meaning. And they had the less excuse because during this time the work was being rapidly completed on the Continent. Had the Dons been acquainted with modern languages instead of with dead tongues exclusively, they could hardly have failed to be conscious of the work which well-known foreign commentators, such as Schwegeler and Carl Prantl and Zeller, were erecting on the foundation first laid by Kant. What is true of Greek thought is also in a measure true of modern science. The awakening has come to the old Universities late. They are now doing very fine work, but they ought to have been able to develop it much sooner. Some stimulus has been wanting. Had their students lived under a

national system where there were many Universities, and where the scholar was free to move from one to another to seek the professor of his choice, instead of being tied up in his academic domicile of origin, the teachers would have been stimulated, and things would probably have moved far more rapidly under the development of the rivalry of talent. But the dominant atmosphere was that, not of the laity, as in Germany, but of the Church, and the result was somnolence. There was lacking the alertness which comes from the supervision of the keen mind and practical instinct of the nation's great men of business. The latter may not know much of literature or science or philosophy, though among them there will always be those who do know. But they recognize quality when they see it, and they are jealous lest the institutions for which they are responsible should be outdistanced in foreign countries. If the new English Universities can keep their level high, they may be able to develop a certain advantage over the older English Universities. When I compare the state of things in Oxford and Cambridge with that in the Universities of Germany, I am impressed with one point in particular in which the latter seem to me superior. In Germany

the student is free to go from time to time, in the course of his undergraduate career, to study under a professor of his own choice in another University. This freedom, of course, implies that much responsibility for the shaping of his own academic career is placed on the shoulders of the student. But it stimulates his intelligence and tends to save him from getting into a rut. The English tutorial system does not afford the same opportunities for bringing him into stimulating contact with the greatest academic personalities of his day. This matters less, as it seems to me, to the student of exceptional keenness and ability than it does to the merely average undergraduate. And it is perhaps the reason why the typical average undergraduate in England, as one sees him after he leaves the University, appears to bear the marks of a training which has been social rather than intellectual, and to be somewhat lacking in awareness of his own limitations.

It is to the production by the Civic University of the quality of alertness in the average as well as in the exceptional student that I look with hope for the future. There will be many mistakes of detail made in the government of the new University. But that

government is likely to compensate for such shortcomings by its vigour and keenness. What is requisite for the sustaining of that vigour and keenness is that the city should be proud of its University, and should feel that it is its own child in whose future the citizens are profoundly concerned, and whose glory will lend support and strength to the renown of the parents. I can see no limit to what may be the development of the Civic University within the next hundred years. I look to its becoming the dominant and shaping power in our system of national education. We have got into all sorts of difficulties, religious and otherwise, from beginning too low down. We could not help ourselves ; we had no University system, spread over the country, to lay hold of and shape into one whole the teachers and the taught alike. In the elementary schools rigid rule and abstract principle are apt to become ends in themselves instead of means to ends. In a system which is merely a vast assemblage of schools in which children must be taught according to a common scheme, the " either or " of the abstract understanding is far more difficult to escape from than it is in the University, where freedom to teacher and student alike in the shaping of educational ideals is of the

line, who has occasion to know England well, remarked to me recently that when he goes on official visits to the North he finds Universities becoming increasingly prominent in all municipal functions of a public character. These new Universities stand, and are put forward more and more naturally as standing, for the highest life of the places where they have taken root. Yet these new Universities are only in their infancy. What they may become and what influence they may wield we cannot foresee. What we do know is that they have made a profound appeal to what is best and most characteristic in the communities in which they flourish. They are supported by these communities with far less aid from the State than is the case abroad. And this is the source of their strength. By degrees the principle of learning for learning's sake will become their accepted foundation. It is of the nature of the case that certain sides of this new academic life should have most support, the sides which furnish the supply of what business men feel to be most required. But they are rapidly outgrowing the stage in which the technological departments were almost exclusively predominant. Their faculties of art are still weak, but as the demand for an art training

grows, as grow it must, for the sake of such vocations as teaching and theology, of administration and of law and other learned callings, this kind of faculty will develop. The example of Germany shows how literature and philosophy may flourish in a University which has the busiest civic surroundings, and there is no reason why that example should not be followed in this country. Time and the growth of enlightenment are what is requisite.

One characteristic feature they possess, and I think to their advantage. In Germany the Technical Colleges have been sharply divided from the University and given a separate existence. This is partly due to the division and separation in character of the great secondary schools in Germany. The resulting separation of the Technical College from the University has been deplored by some of the most distinguished authorities on German Education, notably by the late Professor Paulsen. If this be a thing to be avoided, we have avoided it. We have made our start by treating education as a single and indivisible whole—and by trying to keep the different kinds of students in one organization. How powerful this tendency is we may see by the example of Cambridge, which has

yielded to it, and has gone to an extent in extending the ambit of its activities to technical training which would be looked on askance by many University authorities in Germany. We have done even more, for we have developed in connection with our new Universities a system of evening teaching for a separate class of student, which has enabled them to bring their influence to bear on those who during the day are engaged in earning their livelihood by manual or other work. That the tendency to recognize this kind of instruction as legitimate for the British University is increasing appears when we look at such cases as those of Glasgow and Manchester, where the great Technical Colleges of these cities are being brought into the closest relation with their Universities. I believe this to be entirely right, and I am glad that you in Bristol took the same course at the beginning when you brought the Merchant Venturers' College, with its evening teaching, into your new University organization. There is no reason why a step of this kind should debar you from setting before yourselves compliance with the great test that the education given to all those who can take advantage of it should be of the highest academic type. And there is this

those who are now working among you, and working, not as a foreign body imported from without, but as a new development of the civic community. Your University is now bone of your bone and flesh of your flesh. What you are concerned to see is that it grows, and grows in no slavish way. Now the idea of such a place of learning has become much enlarged in our own time. Not only is the class to which it appeals wider, but its conception of its work is wider. It aims at producing the *esprit de corps* among its pupils. The Union and the Common Room are growing up. Then there are other features, to one of which I refer with something of paternal affection. The Officers' Training Corps differs widely from the old Volunteer or Cadet Corps, which used to be all that our Universities contributed to the defence of their country. Five years ago, when I was at the War Office, we came to see that it was waste of splendid material to aim at the production of nothing higher than this from among University students, and that what we needed most was to get from them a Reserve of educated men who had had sufficient training as officers to be available in the event of war. We appealed to the Universities, new and old, but not until we had carefully prepared our plans. The

Officers' Training Corps of the modern University is wholly different from the old University Volunteer Corps. And the reason is twofold. It has now been shaped for the accomplishment of a definite end, the training for the duties of command in great emergency of educated young men who will, even in time of peace, put their obligations to their country before their love of ease and amusement. The second reason is that this training is given, not as of yore under the drill sergeant, not even under the ordinary officer, but under the direction and supervision of the picked brains of the British Army—the new General Staff. Such training, based on the best scientific methods, therefore takes its place naturally within the sphere of work of the University, and expands and completes the work of that University.

I have referred to the Union and to the Officers' Training Corps as signs of the times, as indications of the way in which the conception of University life is being widened. Other indications there are of the extended scope which is visible in several directions of the meaning of academic life and training. But it is enough to say that this life and training have no limits set for them except the insistence that the work must be

educational, mentally and spiritually, and educational in a high sense. The test of University work is, after all, like that of literature—size and level. I have faith that this truth has now been realized, and that among the Civic Universities, the centres be it observed of guidance and the higher teaching for the districts which are assigned to and surround them, the duty of maintaining a high level is one which will be seen to jealously. The professors have a deep responsibility in this respect, and the general body of citizens have a responsibility hardly less. Nothing is more encouraging than the way in which co-operation in the joint endeavour has been visible up to now in the proceedings of the governing bodies, and there is no reason to anticipate that the future will be less encouraging.

This is what I wish to say in conclusion. Do not let us be discouraged by apparent slowness in progress. It is only when a long tract of time has been covered that the full character of the movement forward that has taken place within it can be seen. Much has been done within the short period since the University of Bristol came into existence. Much remains to be done. But if the great city becomes more and more proud of its

University, and more and more conscious of the nature of the young life that has been born to it, then there will not be wanting the conditions that are requisite for growth to full maturity. The day may come when the citizen of Bristol will be able to look back on his life as made up of distinct phases which have this in common, that he owes all of them to his native place. He may as now look to the city as the place of his birth, the place where he lived with his parents, and with which his earliest associations are connected. He may look to it as the place where he grew up from youth to manhood, and where, by virtue of the strength that was in him, he made conquest for himself of wealth and reputation. He may look to it as the arena in which he threw himself into an honourable rivalry for success in public life, and in the endeavour to do the utmost that within him lay to benefit his fellow human beings. And, last but not least, he may look to it as the home of the University which gave him his great impulses, which moulded his soul, and imparted to him not only the knowledge that was the source of strength, but the most glorious inspirations of his youth.

If you, in whose hands rests the making of

the future, accomplish the task of rendering this and perhaps even more than this possible in your own city, you will have deserved well of the nation of which you form a part.

The Soul of a People

YOU are students of the University of Wales, and I am a Scotsman whom you have invited here as being not unfamiliar with the conditions of University life. It is in the main with what University life can mean that I shall concern myself in this address. Of the general affairs of Wales and of Scotland I shall not speak. They remain to be topics of discourse by those, and they are numerous, who are well qualified to deal with them. I wish to direct your attention to something which seems to me to touch the foundations of national affairs at an even deeper level than that of ordinary politics.

There is a characteristic which the people of Wales and the people of Lowland Scotland, differing profoundly in other respects, appear to possess in common. They are both idealist in their cast of mind. You of Wales have the gift of imagination. It has enabled you to strike out some distinctive lines for your-

selves in your higher education and in your religion. You are not easily daunted by difficulties, and you act together with an enthusiasm which penetrates to the humblest classes of the community. The common effort made to develop your higher schools and University Colleges has been an effort which in reality owed much of its success to the response of those who work with their hands. In the soul of your people there is what George Buchanan called a *præservidum ingenium*, a fire which is more Celtic than it is Saxon. We Lowland Scotsmen are also at heart idealist, but our idealism is of a different kind. Our temperament is reflective rather than imaginative. We move easily in the current of abstract discussion, and we are tenacious of intellectual purpose. The *Treatise of Human Nature*, the *Wealth of Nations*, and *Sartor Resartus* are books typical of a characteristic form of Scottish idealism. Probably no other part of the United Kingdom could have produced writers of this type, and, along with them, men like John Knox, and the Covenanters, and Dr. Chalmers. I think those to whom I have referred are at least as distinctively representative of Scottish habits of mind as are Burns and Scott. For they are the spiritual children of a race

which loves abstract speculation as you love music and verse. In the case of both races there is present the spirit of idealism—idealism which when it comes to the surface flows in different channels, but is not the less on that account idealism.

To Ireland I can only allude in passing. It seems to me that in reality we study the Irish people too little to appreciate properly what the British nation has owed and to-day owes to that strain of Celtic blood. Differences of religion and habit of mind, and irritation over friction in the machinery of Government, have encouraged the Anglo-Saxon community in these islands to give the rein in the case of Ireland to our national habit of not taking the trouble that is necessary to understand those who have great gifts, but gifts that are not like our own.

Now I come to England, and here my patriotism lays me under no illusion. The Welsh, the Irish, and the Scots have this in common, that in different ways they have had much to complain of in the attitude towards them of the English. Even when civilization in England was a long way ahead of civilization in other parts of the United Kingdom—as it was, for instance, when Sir Robert Walpole was the real ruler of the country—

we can gather from the not too sympathetic pages of Macaulay how the English habit of mind worried and galled Celt and Scot alike. And yet, speaking for myself and as a Scotsman, I most genuinely admire this dominant race, even in their Philistinism. They think ahead but little. They are worse at organizing for the fulfilment of definite ends beyond those of the moment than almost any of their rivals. And yet they hold their own in the world, and I see no indication that they are in the least degree failing to hold it. They are almost always late in coming on the ground, but when they do come they set to work silently and with courage. They proceed with marvellous initiative to repair their errors of omission, and they drop their practice of saying depressing things about themselves and their institutions until they see themselves again on the top. When a new invention, like the submarine or the motor, comes to light, the Englishman is usually behind. Give him a few years and he has not only taken care of himself in the meantime, but is generally leading. As it was with these inventions, so I suspect it will prove to be with aircraft.

Being at present charged with some part of the endeavour to see that we catch up other

nations in matters of science applied to defence, I have experience of what happens when the British people are exhorted to make efforts in times of tranquillity. The reply is invariably that there is no necessity to worry them, and that the one thing needful is for the Government to spend the taxes plentifully, and to damn the differential calculus emphatically. Yet this very people, when it was caught unprepared and threatened with defeat a few years ago in South Africa, calmly put its shoulder to the wheel, and without a groan set itself to get through a situation which would have appalled a nation with a more nervous temperament.

Well, the English are good partners for you Celts and for us Lowland Scots in our common business enterprises. All we need ask of them is to leave us to manage our purely domestic affairs and to conduct our family worship in our own fashion. They are on these conditions valuable comrades. And let us remember that they go on periodically producing from among themselves individualities of very great power, individualities that could only spring from a very great race. Shakespeare and Milton, Cromwell (whom I hold to have been in spirit, at all events, a most genuine Englishman, though I know you claim him as

Welsh), Chatham, Nelson and Wellington, Newton and Darwin, these are indicative of a rich soil, a soil which I believe to be as rich and productive to-day as it ever has been.

The real question is how, in this remarkable partnership, we may best help each other through the medium of our special aptitudes, and develop not only the partnership but ourselves. Now the Englishman is short of ideas, so it seems to me, more than of anything else, and it is just ideas that we two races, in our different fashions, can put into the common stock. By ideas I mean large permeating ideas—ideas such as have been the origin of the remarkable power which the Welsh and Scottish Universities are showing to-day of penetrating the people around them with the influence of the higher learning. And in the rest of this address I propose to confine myself to the very illustration which the higher education affords, because I believe that this is an illustration which throws light on every other part of the field of work. The development of the true spirit of the University among a people is a good measure of the development of its soul, and consequently of its civilization.

I have taken as the title of this discourse, "The Soul of a People." The expression

"soul" has a pretty definite meaning. It does not signify to-day a sort of thing existing apart from the body, the *animula*, *vagula*, *blandula* of the Emperor Hadrian's famous verses. Nor has it its seat in any particular place in the body corporate. And just as this is true of the physical organism, so it is true of the State. The soul of a people is to be looked for in no one class or institution. The soul of a human being is the highest form of his activity, what permeates the members and makes their life consist in belonging to the whole of which they form parts. Separated from that whole they cannot live. Although it is nothing outside or detached from these parts or members of itself, it is everywhere present in them. It is their formative principle, their ideal, the end which they fulfil, and which determines them, not as a cause operating from without, but as a purpose working itself out within their course of development from birth to death. It preserves the unity of the organism and guides it along that course, notwithstanding that the material of that organism does not remain the same but is constantly changing. It is the higher and intelligent life of the organism without which it could not be a human being. More than two thousand years ago Aristotle dis-

covered this truth, and called the soul the "entelechy" of the body.

Now what is true of the human organism is true of the State. The soul of a people is just its entelechy, and the higher manifestations of its soul afford a test of the standard of civilization to which that people has attained. The capacity for learning and the consequent development of the University spirit are of course no exclusive test. Literature and art, science and religion, may advance independently of Universities. But on the whole and as a rule, the development proceeds *pari passu*. And to maintain the Universities of the country at a high level is thus an act of high patriotism on the part of the citizens. But not only the citizen but the student himself has a deep responsibility here. When the latter goes to the University, he is an adult and is treated as being such. He has consequently not only rights as a member of the University, but duties towards the institution to which he belongs. It is his privilege to be called on to keep high the level of its tone, and to contribute ideas for its development. To each student comes the opportunity for influencing those around him ; in other words, for leadership. Moving his fellow-students individually he moves the

University, and so in the end moves the State itself. Therefore I would impress on you who are here before me the reality of your duty and of its importance. Your way is clear—to get the best you can for yourselves in this generally unique period of your lives, and to strive with all your power to make the fullest use of what you have got, and to impart it to those around you. It is so that you will begin to fulfil the duty you have to discharge now, and will have to discharge still more later on in life—of striving to develop the soul of the people to whom you belong.

To the question how you may best equip yourselves for this endeavour, my answer is an old one—By getting ideas, ideas which, as has been said, have hands and feet, ideas which not only transform that on which they are brought to bear, but in doing so expand themselves and their meaning. For nothing is so expansive as the train of thought suggested by an idea that is really great; and, if it has once been fully grasped, nothing transforms the whole outlook in the fashion that its suggestive power does. Now, to get great ideas we require great teachers. These teachers may be living persons with whom we come in daily contact, or they may be

dead and yet teach us through great books which they have given to the world. In whichever way it comes, the teaching required is that which guides to a large outlook and to none but a large outlook. Yet after all it is only to a limited extent that the teacher, be he living or one who though dead yet speaks, can mould his student. There is no royal road to learning. The higher it is the harder is the toil of the spirit that is required for its attainment. But this toil brings with it happiness. As we advance along the path we see more and more new territory to traverse, new heights to scale, heights which are accessible only by patient labour, but the scaling of which promises us a new sense of possession. In all this there is much of the sweet in sad and the sad in sweet. Yet the mere endeavour, even apart from the result, brings its reward. There is a passage in *Romola* in which George Eliot describes this kind of experience of the scholar: "We can only have the highest happiness, such as goes along with being a great man—by having wide thoughts, and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before every-

thing else, because our souls see it is good." For him who seeks to live at the higher levels of life, be it in learning or in art or in conduct, adversity has its uses. It detaches his mind, and develops in it the sense of that freedom that can only come when the spirit is tied to no one particular possession, but has grown everywhere capable of rising to freedom. It is hard for the rich man, who cannot free himself from the obsession of his riches and treat them as a means to an end, to reach the kingdom of heaven. On the other hand, the mind that is really free is the mind that chooses to submit itself to toil and discipline, to renounce much, and to pursue its course, not as an arbitrary course, but as one of self-development in accordance with law and principle. If we would succeed, nay, if we would be free from what is the worst burden of all, slavery to an arbitrary will which seeks only the gratification of its immediate impulses, we must learn to renounce and to limit ourselves. We must accept the negative, not to sit down helpless before it, but to rise above it to a larger outlook brought about by what we started from being enriched by its incorporation. Just as the body grows by assimilating inorganic and foreign material from the environment and transforming it to

its own uses, just as the social organism develops in proportion as it gives rights to new classes of citizens and brings within itself and raises to a higher level and sense of responsibility those who in a previous generation would have been treated as unworthy of civil rights, so the mind of the scholar grows. It grows in strength and breadth as it assimilates what it costs a hard struggle and much renunciation of passing pleasure to grasp. But what is thus grasped is, in the process of being so grasped, transcended and freed from the appearance of being foreign and uninteresting. This is the meaning of the conquest of the negative, and without the conquest of the negative there is no real growth, intellectual or moral. If I may presume to suggest something to those of my hearers who are students, it is to acquire as early in life as you can a business-like habit of concentration. There are people who say that youth is the time to enjoy life, and that therefore much of youth should be reserved for enjoyment while that is still possible. Now I am far from suggesting to you that you should cut yourselves off from the resources of amusement. On the contrary, I think that capacity for these forms a part of the widest life. What is called recreation has a detaching and

enlarging quality. But do not jump from this to the conclusion that apolausticism is a safe philosophy of conduct. In these days everything is so specialized and so difficult that nothing short of concentration of a close kind is enough. No one can in our time accomplish the production of any solid contribution to the common stock of ideas unless he is prepared to devote years to preparing himself and his whole soul for work which will be his chief interest and chief amusement. I do not mean that he will look on golf as a penance, but equally he will not feel it to be a temptation. These diversions had better not be left to become ends in themselves. They are apt to take a very firm hold on us Britons, a race peculiarly qualified to identify life with sport. But life is short, and there is too much to be got into it, if it is to be fully lived, to admit of anything being made its chief end, consciously or unconsciously, except that which weighs most when put into the ultimate balance. It is quality as well as quantity that counts.

What we have really got to do, all of us, is to keep keen our sense of fine quality. This sense is easily blunted. And we cannot rely on abstract maxims as to what we can safely look to keep it whetted. Prigs are

easily manufactured, and so are pedants, and each sort is apt to pass with itself and with none other for genuine. The surest way is to select, and concentrate on what is selected, and then to follow up that concentration by trying to work with passion. Without passion, said a famous critic of life, nothing great has ever been accomplished. It is no very different saying from one which is better known, that genius is "an infinite capacity for taking pains." Of course, in talking to you who are here, when I speak of selecting an object of study and concentrating on it with passion, I do not mean *any* object. I mean one which, being your free choice, is high enough in quality to admit of the dedication of life to it—for a time or indefinitely. And here there is another snare to be avoided. Narrow and abstract views, alike in the selection of the object and in the pursuit of its study, have to be avoided. The sense of proportion must be present in the mind of the most faithful of students, if he is not to be preyed on by the imps of Comedy. That is why it is good to have before one's mind the figure of some great man who has been above this kind of criticism, in that his life and his study have been so simple and transparent that we are compelled not only to admire but even

to reverence them. A Berkeley, a Newton, or a Darwin gives one this sense. Their striving seems so genuine as to suggest unconsciousness not only of any personal ambition but even of self. It is figures like these that inspire the University student, and that suggest to him great ideas. In the books they have written, and in the traditions of their personal lives, he finds leadership. In close spiritual contact with such figures he gains the inspiration which will in his own way make him a leader in some circle which may be great or may be small, but which will look to him who is thus inspired as a leader. By such examples, and through the training which close spiritual contact with such examples gives, the soul of a people grows.

In the pursuit of learning, not less than in the management of the affairs of nations, stress ought to be laid on hero-worship. Nothing is more stimulating to him who is striving to learn, nothing increases his faith in what is possible, so much as reverence, though it may come only through books, for the personality of a great intellectual and moral hero. Of those heroic leaders there are different kinds, and their common quality is the possession of some kind of genius. An Alexander and an Aristotle, a Napoleon and

a Goethe, are super-men, but super-men in virtue of wholly different gifts from above. The characters of its greatest men are the greatest books the world possesses, and we do well to be constantly reading in them. Such records always stimulate, and sometimes inspire. They are priceless for the true student, for they are his best guides in the search for ideas. Some names come into my mind as typical of what I meant when I was speaking to you of idealism, idealism of the special kind which can bring to unity faith and thought, religion, morality, and art. There are men who have consecrated their souls to this great endeavour, and, if the finiteness which is of the essence of humanity has made it necessary that we should pass beyond their modes of expression, they have none the less succeeded in carrying the advance of the Spirit towards truth a stage farther. None of us can read the account of the last hours of Socrates which Plato puts into the lips of Phaedo, without recognizing that here was one whose words are a permanent possession for mankind. He lived in constant striving to reach the truth, and for what he held against the Athenian citizens to be the truth he suffered death at their hands. When the hour of sunset was near, so Plato

tells us, the jailer came to him to announce to him that now he must die, and made this speech : " To you, O Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid men drink the poison—indeed I am sure that you will not be angry with me ; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are the guilty cause. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what needs must be ; you know my errand." Then bursting into tears, he turned away and went out. Socrates looked at him and said : " I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid ! " Then turning to us, he said : " How charming the man is : since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good as could be, and now see how generously he sorrows for me—but we must do as he says ; Crito, let the cup be brought." " Yet," said Crito, " the sun is still on the hilltops, and I know that many an one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved ; do not hasten then, there is still time." Socrates replied : " Yes,

self the most modest and retiring of men. One enthusiast, a philosopher of some distinction, declared that in a hundred years Kant would have the reputation of Jesus Christ. But when we forget these extravagances, and look at the figure of Kant in the dry light of the judgment of posterity, it still stands out as deeply impressive. Whether one turns to the theoretical or to the practical side of his system, his writing seems to have a quality which is described in his own words when defending himself in the closing years of his life against a narrow-minded minister of Frederick William, King of Prussia: "I have always conceived the Judge in myself as standing by my side during the composition of my writings, so as to keep myself free, not only from every soul-destroying error, but even from every carelessness in expression which might cause offence." He left the world a stage farther on in the deeper sort of knowledge than he found it. In the words of one of his biographers: "For those who have learned Kant, many questions have ceased to trouble; many are bright with a light unknown before; and others are at least placed in a fair way for further solution."

I will try to sketch for you another of those "Saints of Rationalism," to use a phrase

which Mr. Gladstone employed about John Mill. And this time I will take the figure of one who lived down to our own time and whom I myself knew well, a figure not of the very first order, it may be, but yet that of a great man, one who, himself a German, was able to call a halt to the powerful movement of German Idealism, and to force its advocates to subject their principles to a fresh and searching scrutiny. Hermann Lotze has become very well known in this country, partly by direct study, and not a little by the book written on his philosophy by Professor Henry Jones, one of the most brilliant thinkers whom your higher learning in Wales has produced. Lotze's doctrine was that abstract thought is by itself powerless to penetrate to the inner kernel of reality, and that the ultimate criterion of truth must be looked for in the highest forms of emotion, and in the faith which has its origin in that emotion. He sought to limit the region in which the power of mere logical reasoning can give results. He led the revolt, an almost passionate revolt, against what he believed, I think wrongly, to be the outrage committed by Hegel and his disciples against the riches and warmth of reality. "Du hast sie zerstört, die schöne Welt," cried out the chorus of Spirits to Faust,

and to the apostles of *Wissenschaft* Lotze cried it out not less vehemently. He refused to identify reality with thought, or to reduce the world to what Mr. Bradley has called an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." On the positive side he asserted that feeling was the source of the ideal of knowledge, and that, with no other powers than those of mere intellect, we should not reach that ideal or even seek it. The good is a higher category than the true, and comprehends and exhausts its meaning.

I will quote the words in which he sums up in the concluding paragraphs of his *Mikro-kosmos* the results of his investigations: "It has seemed to us that everywhere the universal was inferior as compared with the particular, the class as compared with the individual, any state of things insignificant as compared with the good arising from its enjoyment. For the universal, the class, and the state of things belong to the mechanism into which the Supreme articulates itself; the true reality that is and ought to be is not Matter and is still less Idea, but is the living personal Spirit of God and the world of personal Spirits which He has created. They only are the place in which Good and good things exist; to them alone does there appear an extended material

world, by the forms and movements of which the thought of the Cosmic whole makes itself intelligible through intuition to every finite mind." Knowledge finds its goal in Truth, Feeling in the Good, or Supreme worth. "Taking Truth," he says, "as a whole, we are not justified in regarding it as a mere self-centred splendour, having no necessary connection with those stirrings of the soul from which, indeed, the impulse to seek it first proceeded. On the contrary, whenever any scientific revolution has driven out old modes of thought, the new views that take their place must justify themselves by the permanent and increasing satisfaction which they are capable of affording to those spiritual demands, which cannot be put off or ignored." "Rather let us admit that in the obscure impulse to treat higher aspects of things which we sometimes glory in, and sometimes feel incapable of rising to, there is yet a dim consciousness of the right path, and that every objection of science to which we attend does but disperse some deceptive light cast upon the one immutable goal of our longings by the changing standpoints of growing experience."¹ Every man, said Emerson, is born to be either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. Every man

¹ *Mikrokosmos*, Introduction.

has a tendency either towards Idealism or towards a Realism which may or may not be such as the Realism of Lotze. He has produced a deep effect on German thought, and his influence has crossed the seas to Britain and America. The theological teaching of his fellow-professor Ritschl, and of Harnack later on, seems to me to be in a large part the outcome of the principles of Lotze. They turned away from the controversies about the Gospels and the investigations of the Tübingen School, to seek in the origins of Christianity for a foundation which should require no metaphysical assistance, but should be its own witness. Whether they have succeeded time will show. It may be that they, and Lotze too, will turn out only to have opened anew the door to scientific doubt. But their work has been a great work, alike in the extent of its influence and in the spirit in which it was conceived.

I have spoken to you of Lotze—not merely because he was a notable figure, representative of some of the finest qualities of the soul of the great German people. He was great as a teacher, whether or not his thinking was more than that of a profound critic of other systems. He was great equally as a moral figure, a personality with which none could

be in contact without being influenced by it. Thirty-six years ago I was bidden to choose for myself whether I would go to Oxford or to a German University, and I chose Göttingen because Lotze was there. I was only seventeen, little more than a boy. I remember vividly how spiritually as well as intellectually anchorless I felt in the early days of my residence in the old University town where lay the Hanoverian centre of learning. Göttingen was in those days full of great men. Gauss and Riemann and Weber were dead, but Wöhler was there, and Benfey and Sauppe and von Jhering and Ritschl—names that stood in the "seventies" for what was highest in Germany in science and classical learning and jurisprudence and theology. Yet the figure that stood out above all the others was that of my old master, Hermann Lotze. I had the privilege, boy as I was, of seeing him often in his study as well as of listening in his lecture-room, and to the end of my life I shall hold the deep impression he made on me—of a combination of intellectual power and the highest moral stature. It seems to me but yesterday that he used quietly to enter the lecture-room where we students sat expectant, and, taking his seat, fix his eyes on space as though he were looking into another

world remote from this one. The face was worn with thought, and the slight and fragile figure with the great head looked as though the mind that tenanted it had been dedicated to thought and to nothing else. The brow and nose were wonderfully chiselled, the expression was a combination of tolerance with power. The delivery was slow and exact, but the command of language was impressive. Our feeling towards him as we sat and listened was one of reverence mingled with affection.

Such was Hermann Lotze as I knew him. I have often wondered whether Browning had not visited Göttingen before he wrote his *Christmas Eve*, and whether it was Lotze he had in his mind when he describes how the spirit took him from place to place, until at last—

"Alone by the entrance-door
Of a sort of temple—perhaps a college,
Like nothing I ever saw before
At home in England to my knowledge.
The tall, old, quaint, irregular town—
It may be—though which, I can't
Affirm any,
Of the famous middle-age towns of Germany;
Is it Halle, Weimar, Cassel, Frankfort
Or Göttingen, I have to thank for 't?
It may be Göttingen—most likely."

Then he describes how he enters the lecture-

room and sits down among the students, and a professor comes in :

" I felt at once as if there ran
A shoot of love from my heart to the man,

Who stood surveying his auditory
With a wan pure look, well-nigh celestial,
Those blue eyes had survived so much,
While under the foot they could not smutch
Lay all the fleshly and bestial."

The figure of Socrates is typical of the soul of the people of ancient Greece. The figures of Kant and Lotze are typical of much that has been distinctive in the soul of modern Germany, of its idealism and of its culture. We do well to study such typical figures and to hold them in reverence. Especially do they represent much of what counts for the highest in University life in all countries. And it is in the Universities, with their power over the mind, greater in the end than the power of any government or of any church, that we see how the soul of a people at its highest mirrors itself. Your University life in this country of Wales is but young. We do not yet see how far it will develop. But what I know of the spirit of your people gives me the sense that the soil in which that young life has taken root is fertile in a high degree.

I will close this address with the words in which Fichte, a hundred and five years since, took leave of his hearers at the University of Erlangen on an occasion like this :

“ If a thought of mine have entered into any now present, and shall abide there as a guide to higher truth, perhaps it may sometimes awaken the memory of this discourse and of me—and only in this way do I desire to live in your recollection ! ”

The Calling of the Preacher

YOU have invited one who is a layman to deliver a presidential address to you who are theological students. It is not without misgiving that I have accepted your invitation and come here to speak. And I will say at once that it is only as a layman—a layman in spirit as well as in name—that I am here. I will take my chance simply as a man of the world who has been given an opportunity of telling what he has found helpful, and what the reverse, in sermons to which he has listened. I may, I think, fairly regard myself as able to represent to you a good many of those who will be your future hearers. I belong to no particular caste. I have had opportunities of observing various phases of social life. I have been a good deal in contact with the working classes, and I have known something of the atmosphere breathed by kings and their courtiers. I have spent part of

my life at seats of learning, in this country and abroad, and I have associated with lawyers and men of business, with soldiers and with statesmen. I have had, as intimate friends, men of science, professors of philosophy, and ministers of religion. If, then, I am a layman in the unusual position of speaking with theologians, I hope to try to use the opportunity you have thought fit to give me without falling into the narrow groove that arises from habitual confinement to single topics.

This is all I have to say by way of *apologia*. The subject which I have chosen is "The Calling of the Preacher," and I have chosen it because, after listening to many discourses from pulpits, it appears to me that there are things which one who is usually a listener may respectfully urge on those to whom he listens. After all, they have to stimulate and instruct others, and there are things which ought, from the standpoint of the listener, to be said about how this must be done if it is to be successful. What is it that we come for to the churches? Come we do, and in numbers that probably do not really diminish, however the outward semblance of habit may have changed. There is deep down in human nature an earnest craving for spiritual stimula-

tion and enlightenment ; the money and the buildings, and the time and the organization, which are to-day being devoted in all countries to the satisfaction of this craving, are the proof of its reality.

Yet there is dissatisfaction. People feel that very often they do not get what they have come to seek. Many sermons fall flat, and, were it not for a vague but very evident desire for association in some sort of spiritual community, congregations would be smaller. All is not right, and the question to be answered is what it is that is wrong, and where it is that the remedy is to be sought.

Some forty years ago, Matthew Arnold, an Englishman more than usually well equipped for criticism, wrote a book which seems to me to have been misunderstood. Whatever objection may properly be taken to the tone of some of the passages in *Literature and Dogma*, the task which the author set before him was one which he took up in all seriousness. It was, in his own words, "to find, for the Bible, a basis in something which can be verified, instead of in something which has to be assumed." He quotes Vinet with approval as declaring that "we must make it our business to bring forward the rational

side of Christianity, and to show that for thinkers, too, it has a right to authority." Arnold's solution was to read and learn as much as possible, "getting the power, through reading, to estimate the proportion and relation in what we read." His conclusion may be illustrated by his declaration that we should be safest with a conception of God as "the Eternal Power, not ourselves, by which all things fulfil the law of their being." With this as his standard he passed many criticisms on the ways of saying and doing that were current in Church circles in England in his time, criticisms many of which have turned out to be over-anxious. But the book was in reality a very serious book, and, despite certain faults of taste, it emphasized great truths. Much has happened since Arnold wrote. The influence, which he dreaded, of Strauss and Mr. Bradlaugh has passed away. The old form of unbelief, the opposing of dogma to dogma, no longer confronts us. And yet there is apparent, even more than in the period when Arnold wrote, the indifference which arises from want of grasp and of faith. Men and women are convinced of the reality of social problems in a way they were not then, and they work at them with the devotion which is the child of conviction.

tion. But they are not stirred as they were once by religious doctrine. A century has hardly passed since it was the custom in every sermon preached in Scotland by the evangelical school to set forth, fully and without fail, the cardinal doctrine of the Atonement. The reason of the practice was that words which to-day seem to many abstract, imperfect, and remote, were to our ancestors the most vivid means possible of imparting the sense of reality. I am not sure that the truth which underlay the old pictorial images was very different from the conclusions of knowledge as they are to-day. The forms in which the deeper learning as to the nature of ultimate reality are expressed, vary in different generations with the changes of the time spirit. But the substance, the ideal, which the efforts of each age aim at expressing, human as these efforts are, this substance, this ideal, remains permanent. What is needful is that the language in which we endeavour to give expression to the creeds should be of a character to awaken belief. Words which inculcate the great moral and religious duty of man towards his neighbour, the sacredness with which Christianity has invested every human personality, however lowly—words like these are, it is true, capable of giving

the same sense of reality as did the old statements of the doctrine of the Atonement. Yet in neither case is the form of expression satisfactory. We are probably at least as one-sided to-day as our ancestors were, only the one-sidedness is of a different kind. And if we ask why the disposition to look away from the old doctrine, and indeed from all abstract doctrines, is so marked, the answer seems to be that among the great mass of the people, not less than among the learned, there is a general distrust of abstract propositions. This is not a phenomenon which is confined to theology. It is apparent in contemporary philosophy, and it is manifest through the range of the sciences, from mathematics to biology. Every one seems afraid of saying anything without at once qualifying it by adding that his assertion is provisional only, merely a partial and fragmentary effort to express the truth, and is to be taken as nothing else.

Now valuable as this cautious spirit is in getting rid of superstition—philosophical and scientific, as well as theological—it brings with it immensely increased difficulties for the teacher and the preacher alike. They have not the power of moving their hearers that their forefathers had, because they are not

themselves convinced as their forefathers were. The modern preacher has not to face the counter dogmas of a Bradlaugh or a Strauss, the kind of prophet whose power Matthew Arnold feared. He is, on the contrary, confronted with doubts as to the very possibility of knowledge and the capacity of intelligence itself. Such doubts carry with them misgiving as to religious doctrine, at all events in so far as it pretends to scientific accuracy. If Matthew Arnold were writing to-day he would be troubled, not by the progress of unbelief of the old dogmatic kind, but by the influence of the pragmatic doubts of Professor William James, that remarkable thinker who has recently passed from among us, and of the questionings about the validity of intellectual processes which are associated to-day with the famous name of M. Bergson. It is true that Pragmatism, freshly as it was stated by the American philosopher whom some of us who were his friends are now mourning, is nothing new ; it is indeed little more than a resuscitation of a definite phase of Greek thought. And as for the doctrine of M. Bergson's brilliant book, *L'Evolution Creatrice*, if anyone will be at the pains to read through the first volume of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, he may think

that, despite the freshness and originality of the modern statement, what is distinctive in Bergson was in part at least anticipated by Schopenhauer three generations ago.

Yet the fact remains that, whether the reasons for doing so are sufficient, a halt in belief has been called, not only in Harvard and in Paris, but all around us, and that this feature of the present time creates fresh difficulties for the preacher. It is little consolation to him to know that he is not alone. It is true that there is as much disposition to hold aloof from doctrines which were accepted as finally established by mathematicians, physicists, and physiologists a generation ago, as there is to hold aloof from the old doctrine of the Atonement. The theories in pure mathematics of the arithmetic continuum as the foundation of the calculus, in physics of the electrical constitution of matter, in biology of the quasi-purposive action of the parts of a whole as the definition of life, and the consequent rejection of the old mechanical negation of vitalism—these when you analyse them turn out to be intellectual efforts of a negative or critical rather than of a constructive character. In the same way much that has recently been

written about philosophy means rather a want of faith in the sweeping results of Idealism than the setting-up of a new and different doctrine. Nevertheless there is consolation for the present-day predominance of the negative. Now, as at other periods, that negative is showing itself to be part and parcel of a movement towards a more complete view. It is disclosing itself, wherever it appears, as the commencement of a necessary correction of what were abstract and narrow points of view. This is notably so in science, where, so far from there being any indication of stagnation, the rate of progress is enormous. Whether we look at mathematics, pure or applied, or physics, or chemistry, or biology, it is no exaggeration to say that nothing approaching the advances in knowledge which are taking place at this moment have ever before been witnessed. And the potent instrument in these advances has been the just use of the negative, the method of criticism and correction, and the consequent widening of conceptions and outlook. Faith in the fact of progress is being substituted everywhere in the region of science for faith in finality of result.

But if this has been so in science, why

should it not be so in philosophy and theology? And if the method of enlarging the outlook can help there, can it not equally do so in the case of the practical preacher? He, like the modern teacher of science, may succeed in inspiring his hearers, not with faith in finality of result, but with faith in continuity of progress. If he is to do so he must resort to the same means. He must gain for himself a wide outlook if he is to teach those who learn from him to have one. Now this was just what Matthew Arnold meant when he wrote *Literature and Dogma*; only, because the circumstances of the time were different, he applied his meaning in a way that is different from what we require to-day.

What he really meant to convey was that we must not shut our eyes to the importance and truth of the negative; for example, in the form of the criticism of the Tübingen School, or of the broader attacks on the authenticity of the Gospel narrative and the Biblical cosmogony contained in such books as *The Old Faith and the New*. But to this I take him to have meant to add something more, which in these days, when much light has been thrown by investigation on the true part played by the negative in knowledge,

would be said more explicitly. To overthrow the evidence on which we are asked to believe in certain miracles is not to overthrow the foundation of Christian faith. Christian faith is rather the foundation of these miracles than itself founded on them. The state of mind which, denying the truth of the narrative of the miracle, excludes also the broad principle of the relation of man to God, of the natural to the supernatural, as taught by Jesus, finds itself in a position as barren as it is dogmatic. The outcome is always a reaction from the attitude of unbelief, but not always a return to the old uncritical ignorance which identified the miracle and the profound truth of which it was symbolical. To restore a simple faith is the object of the great teacher, but the simplicity of that faith he seeks to restore on the basis not of ignorance but of knowledge. A profound conviction of the reality of what is above nature in the presence of God in man, and of the conceptions of God and man being logically necessary each to the other, is at least consistent with the form of this conviction being wholly independent and even contradictory of the notion of any mechanical manifestation of what is divine. It is within us, as immanent, and not without us, that

modern learning teaches us to look for a divine presence. Now Arnold wanted to point his readers to the higher view of the nature of truth, the view in which the abstract affirmative with which we start becomes qualified by a negative which itself is no resting-place, but merely the stepping-stone to a larger and wider outlook from a position which is out of the reach of the waves of controversy. And this outlook he thought could only be reached through enlargement of knowledge. "Get knowledge, get 'Geist,'" he said. And to-day we need "Geist," and we must get knowledge, though knowledge apart from practice cannot be the completion of wisdom. But in what form is the man who is training himself to influence the minds of those who will come to him once a week for guidance, to aim at getting this knowledge!

There is a saying of Heraclitus of Ephesus which is of far-reaching significance: "Much learning does not instruct the mind, else it had instructed Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus. The only wisdom is to know the reason that reigns over all." It is not, in other words, any mere accumulation of book learning that will enable us to rid ourselves of the narrow and abstract

conceptions that are the source of our doubts and perplexities, of the antinomies which rise up like spectres to bar advance towards light. It is the larger outlook which comes from mastery and comprehension, and which shows that it is we who have ourselves set limits to our grasp of the fullness of reality, limits which we transcend even in grasping the fact of their presence. In a sense all knowledge implies self-limitation. In science, as in everything else, it is true that he who would accomplish anything must limit himself. To get his mathematical structures clearly before his mind, the mathematician limits himself. He abstracts his attention from every phase of existence save quantities and rates of change, and with these, *quasi* pictorially indeed, but none the less ideally, he constructs a universe which exists for him not the less because it is only an ideal. He shuts out from attention causes, life, beauty, morality, religion, and much besides. Their existence as actual and necessary phases of the real he does not deny, he simply takes no cognizance of them. In this way he of set purpose affirms the negative. For he has—if he would, with his finite faculties, get beyond the limits of what is immediate, and construct a universe which he can take in and grasp in its entirety

—to restrict the number of the conceptions and categories which he employs. By so doing he exposes himself, in his efforts to comprehend, to temptations to narrow-mindedness. But it is easy for him to avoid them, because it is plain that his special outlook on his world is bound of necessity to be too abstract to be adequate to the richness of the varying and complex content of actual experience. The temptations of the physicist are more subtle and dangerous, for his categories bring him apparently more close to actual experience, and he is more prone in consequence, not merely to search out the negative, which is the stepping-stone to greater clearness and depth of conception, but to regard this experience as confined to the substances and causes for which alone his conceptions or categories enable him to search. It is difficult for him to realize that he has artificially precluded himself from even taking in the fact of life, and much more from interpreting it. He is prone to deny the reality of any whole which is presupposed by and controls its parts or members, as if it were a conscious purpose to the fulfilment of which each of these parts or members devotes itself like a good citizen in a State. And yet such a metaphor, although for other

reasons inapplicable, is nearer to the concrete and actual fact than his own metaphor of a cause operating *ab extra*. For how otherwise is an organism to be explained which develops a course of existence from birth to death, a course which is not arbitrary but conforms to a principle, and in which the living whole preserves the continuity of its existence, though every particle of matter which it takes in from the environment is changed from time to time till not one that was originally there remains? The analogy is certainly more nearly that of the action of an intelligent being than one of the physical relation of cause and effect. Undoubtedly life is real. But the physicist only stumbles into an abyss of bad metaphysics when he tries to interpret and explain it through the only categories which for him are permissible. No more can the biologist—who knows the conception of life and nothing more—penetrate in his capacity as biologist into the world of the moralist or the artist. The history of thought is filled with illustrations of the confusion and failure which has arisen from the attempt to hypostatize the negative in this further form by extending biological conceptions to regions where they do not apply. The truth is that human experience is richer and grander than

can be realized by the exclusive votaries of any one science. Yet their procedure, though its characteristic is insistence on the negative, is a genuine means of advancing knowledge. What explains this apparent contradiction is that their negative is a negative pregnant in which they do not remain, but through which they raise the original affirmative conception to a richer and higher level.

Now I am not, in insisting on the value of this procedure, suggesting to you that the preacher must, in order to do his work, possess universal knowledge. If he tried to acquire it he would probably end in becoming what Heraclitus hints to us that his own predecessors were. It is not so that the preacher can hope to come to know the reason that reigns over all. But I do suggest to you that a man, even of modest abilities, may learn how to free his mind from *idola* which lead him to try to shut the universe into narrow and limited conceptions. He will, if he is to enlarge his horizon, find it essential, unless he has unusual gifts, to discipline his mind by proper study in what I will call the dialectic which is not destructive but constructive. Some there are who possess intuitively the attitude which is for the great

reasons inapplicable, is nearer to the concrete and actual fact than his own metaphor of a cause operating *ab extra*. For how otherwise is an organism to be explained which develops a course of existence from birth to death, a course which is not arbitrary but conforms to a principle, and in which the living whole preserves the continuity of its existence, though every particle of matter which it takes in from the environment is changed from time to time till not one that was originally there remains? The analogy is certainly more nearly that of the action of an intelligent being than one of the physical relation of cause and effect. Undoubtedly life is real. But the physicist only stumbles into an abyss of bad metaphysics when he tries to interpret and explain it through the only categories which for him are permissible. No more can the biologist—who knows the conception of life and nothing more—penetrate in his capacity as biologist into the world of the moralist or the artist. The history of thought is filled with illustrations of the confusion and failure which has arisen from the attempt to hypostatize the negative in this further form by extending biological conceptions to regions where they do not apply. The truth is that human experience is richer and grander than

themselves." Another and more recent writer, Edward Caird, the late Master of Balliol, a man who united to an admirably trained intelligence high moral strenuousness, describes, in connection with this very passage, still more fully the process of the mind in working its way towards freedom from the perplexities that are unavoidable at the outset of its voyage of discovery. I quote from his book on *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*. "Contradiction or Antinomy," he says,¹ "is the necessary law of thought in itself from which it cannot in any region escape. The first stage of intelligence, the stage of common sense, is one in which there is an undeveloped consciousness of the unity of thought with itself through all the diversity of its application, and an equally undeveloped consciousness of the discordance and opposition of the different aspects of things which are gathered together in knowledge. The contradiction of objects with each other, and with the thought that apprehends them, is not yet perceived, and hence no reconciliation is wanted. The identity is felt through the diversity, the diversity through the identity, and no more is required. At times, indeed, one aspect of things is more prominent than

¹ Vol. ii., p. 68.

another. Religious emotion lifts man above the divided and fragmentary existence in which in his secular life he usually dwells, and makes vividly present to him a unity which in general is but shadowy and uncertain. But he passes through the one state of consciousness after the other, without bringing them into contact or considering whether they are consistent or inconsistent. For many, indeed, there never is any conscious discord, and there never is any effort after inward harmony. But even where the intellectual impulse is feeble, the moral difficulties of life are constantly tending to awaken in us a sense of the differences and oppositions that exist in thought and things. And as the mind cannot abjure its faith in itself, it is forced by the necessity of its own development upon a choice between different elements of its life, which seem at first to contradict and to exclude each other."

I have cited these two witnesses to illustrate the attitude which it seems to me should characterize the student of divinity who is seeking to qualify himself to deliver those who come to him from spectres that arise out of ignorance. His aim must be among other things to set men and women on the road of deliverance from the negative, from

the intellectual temptation that arises from a narrow outlook. As a rule they will be individuals who are agitated in spirit too little rather than too much.

Let us try to see what the future preacher will have to aim at, and what the transcending of the negative means in practice. There are many familiar illustrations of this which show its use as a constructive and enlarging factor in the constitution of a greater whole than that with which the first start was made. We see this in the family circle, where husband and wife, parent and child, each grows in stature by the sacrifice of self, and the desire to find and enlarge the self in living in and for another. We see it in the State, where the citizen gives up some of his freedom that others may not have their personalities and liberties infringed by him and thereby secures his own protection and freedom by obedience to laws which are the expression of what Rousseau, imperfectly as he conceived it, described rightly as the "volonté générale," which is more than the "volonté de tous." The larger entirety of the State, like that of the family, arises through its inclusion of the negative in the shape of restraint on individual action. Yet such inclusion is the result not of mere mechanical force *ab extra*, but of the

purposive action of intelligence operating *ab intra*. We see this clearly in the use which the true artist makes of the power of selection and exclusion in his construction of an æsthetic whole. A portrait created by such an artist is no photograph dependent on the chance aspects which nature at the moment presents. Its expression is rather one which is born anew of the mind of the artist himself. He rejects as well as selects. He does not slavishly copy nature. He seeks, often unconsciously, to realize a larger conception of his subject, a conception which may exclude many actual details, but which places its highest meaning for the onlooker in the subject of his picture. In creating a larger whole he raises the standpoint, and he thereby creates that which is independent of particular time and space, and is so made true in a deeper meaning than that of the fashion that passes away as moment succeeds moment.

In the regions of moral and intellectual activity alike, he who would accomplish anything must limit himself. It is only by the sacrifice of himself or his first opinions, in other words by accepting the negative, that he can raise his level and reach his ideal. But the negative must be the negative pregnant. What the preacher, for instance, has

to show is that it is not merely by trampling on the world, but by loving it while trampling upon it, that freedom from that world is to be gained. And he has to show in a fashion analogous that it is not by ignoring the historical and scientific difficulties that embarrass faith in Christianity, but by setting these difficulties in their limited significance and true proportion, while at the same time frankly facing them, that deliverance from doubt is to be got. In each case the process is that of the effort after a larger whole which takes into itself both what was the original standpoint and its qualification through criticism.

In Scotland to-day the prevailing attitude of the working and middle classes seems to me to be that of a mild agnosticism. Now this is not a healthy attitude. It indicates indifference, a disposition to give up the struggle, to jump to premature conclusions, and to accept the negative as an end, and not as the stepping-stone of return to a higher and wider belief in the affirmative. But if there is to be a spiritual victory there must be, as its preliminary, a spiritual struggle. Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* and Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* furnish testimony to this truth—yet testimony which after all falls

short in its convincingness of the testimony of the Gospels themselves. No man is a complete man unless he has wrestled for his mental freedom. It is not enough to exclaim, however sincerely, with Matthew Arnold :

“Calm Soul of all things, make it mine,
To feel, amid the city's jar,
That there abides a peace of Thine
Man did not make, and cannot mar.

“The will to neither strive nor cry,
The power to feel with others give;
Calm, calm me more! Nor let me die
Before I have begun to live.”

The teaching of the Christian religion is sterner than this. If man is to be reconciled with God, he must first realize his division from God, and have the consequent sense of failure. He must learn that the way out is to surrender his will and to find it again in a simple acceptance of the highest will. He must realize not only the meaning but the necessity of dying in order to live. Life is regained and peace attained when he has successfully struggled through the valley of the shadow of the negative, and not before. It is only by furnishing him with the materials necessary for criticism of his own position that even the learning of Heraclitus can help him

along his difficult path. The one power which can conduct him safely to its conclusion is a sense of the divine within himself, a sense which can only be awakened when he has first become practically aware of his intellectual and moral finiteness. These things are taught in the New Testament with a simplicity and directness which is hardly to be found elsewhere. Yet while Christianity did far more than any other influence to introduce these conceptions into the world, they are not the monopoly of the teachers who call themselves Christian. Something of a like conquest and corresponding humility of mind we see in that picture of the dying Socrates which Plato has given to us in the *Phaedo*. The great modern thinkers, in poetry as well as in prose, teach us a similar lesson, and some of them have not been Christians. Yet in the main the source of our inspiration to-day, the example to which we turn, is what we find in the Gospels. Nowhere else is the gap between man and God so displayed in its terrors. Nowhere else is it so completely bridged over. Nowhere else are we taught with the same vividness that God and man alike need each other, the infinite that it may have reality, the finite that it may realize its foundation in infinity.

I abstain from even trying to say how I think you can best work these things out for yourselves. And the reason which restrains me is not difficult to state. No man can accomplish for his brother what is necessary in this regard. Each must work out his salvation in his own way. To some the example of a great intellectual figure, such, for example, as that of Kant, will most appeal, Kant who laboriously thought out the limits of possible knowledge, and, scientifically classifying his perplexities, assigned them individually to the disregard of these limits. He was left, as the result of a life devoted to patient research, with a noble faith in duty, in freedom, in God. Over his bust in the stoa at Königsberg are his own well-known words about the two facts of daily life that he revered most of all: "*Der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das Moralische Gesetz in mir*"—the starry heavens above, and the moral law within.

Or it may be that it is in the region, not of reflection, but of work, that light will be found. Some there are who give themselves for the sake of those about them, and to save these disregard riches, health, life itself. They pass through the portal of renunciation, and in the practice of the presence of God

they find themselves again, and gain a faith which inspires the onlooker with the sense of a higher reality.

Yet underneath the varying forms in which the individual, be he the humblest Christian or the most highly-equipped thinker or poet, dedicates his life to realizing the infinite, the substance of the endeavour remains the same. With no apparently-completed result will the true worker be satisfied. Just because the infinite realizes itself in him he will be conscious of his shortcomings, of something beyond and not attained, in other words of his finitude. Yet, conversely, this consciousness of his limits will not distress him, for in being conscious of them he has the certainty that he is transcending them :

“Rather I prize the doubt
Low kinds exist without,
Finished and finite clods, untroubled by a spark.

“Poor vaunt of life indeed
Were man but formed to feed
On joy, to solely seek and find and feast ;
Such feasting ended, then
As sure an end to men.”

What is important is never to sit still and be satisfied. That is always an indication that the truth is not present. It is really in the

struggle itself and in that alone that we daily gain and keep our life and freedom.

But the sense that the end is never wholly in our sight is no ground for despair or even for misgiving. Finite as we are, compelled to seek to express in pictorial images what these images can never adequately express, there is an aspect of the truth in attaining to which ordinary knowledge requires the aid of what we may call faith, or the sense of things unseen. A great thinker declared that within the range of the finite we can never see or experience that the end has really been secured. But he went on to point out that the accomplishment of the infinite end consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. That illusion can never be completely or actually realized as removed by us mortals. The best we can accomplish is the devotion of ourselves, in reflection or in practice, or in both, to the effort to rise above it. Were we at any moment to succeed completely we should have seen God, and die. Yet the faith that this illusion is but the outcome of our finite nature, and that the finiteness of this nature is essential to us even in as much as we belong to God, brings with it a sense of peace that is not the less real because it passes the

limits of everyday understanding. For it enables us to accept our lot in life, whatever that lot may be, and to say with the conviction of truth attained, "In His will is our peace."

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

IT is characteristic of British people that they should show but little consciousness of their most characteristic institutions. The circumstance is due to two causes. In the first place our Constitution is unwritten. It can be studied adequately only in practice, and not in books which describe it from documents which are never adequate to the reality with its varying shades. In the second place, just because the Constitution is unwritten, it is continuously altering while national policies and purposes are being developed. What was true ten years ago may not be true to-day, and the changes are often almost impossible to ascertain merely from written records. New principles are, according to national habit, clothed in old forms, which are preserved, although the significance of the language that describes them has really altered.

This is so in many departments of the activity of the State. From the time of the Revolution Settlement the abstract principle has been laid down that no money can be expended out of the Consolidated Fund, into which the revenue from taxes is paid, without specific and particular authority from an Act of Parliament. But the further modern principle of requiring devolution wherever practicable has proved too strong to allow the basic principle to continue to operate in its exactness. The requirements of the day have made it necessary for the Treasury to permit anticipations of Parliamentary authority to take place for the purposes of immediate provisions, and to allow grants in aid of which details in expenditure are not supervised by the House of Commons. The organization by which this is done is puzzling to the simple-minded student of the Constitution who does not constantly bear in mind its developing quality and highly practical character.

Again, the prerogative of the Crown is a vague expression. There is not much left of that authority which Parliament at one time left to the Crown uninterfered with by the legislature. And what is left is not only now guarded by the constitutional necessity

of advice from Ministers, who are made responsible to the House of Commons, though no longer to the House of Lords, in the way they once were for giving it, but is also guarded by rules which cannot legally be broken. Thus the Sovereign is said to be the foundation of justice. But since Lord Coke vindicated the power of Parliament in the days of James I, it has been clear that the Sovereign can only administer justice in Courts recognized by Parliament, and that he cannot interfere with the judges who preside in these Courts.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is a Court of this character. It has had a statutory basis since the reign of William IV, and its advice is necessary before a judgment can be given by the King as the supreme justiciar of the Empire. But none the less it does not itself give any judgment. It simply makes a recommendation which is carried out by a formal Order made by the Sovereign at a subsequent stage in a full meeting of the Privy Council. A portion of the prerogative thus remains intact, but only for the Empire beyond the limits of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. For within these limits the jurisdiction of the Sovereign as the supreme tribunal of appeal has long

ago been absorbed by Parliament, and taken over by the House of Lords. Throughout the rest of the Empire the old prerogative jurisdiction of the King-Emperor remains, but remains constitutionally limited by the necessity of advice, not from his Ministers, but from a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, consisting of judges.

The Judicial Committee thus occupies a peculiar position, which can only be made intelligible if the history of the prerogative is closely studied, and the change in the mode of its exercise in entertaining a final appeal is followed out from generation to generation. Even now there are great questions relating to the exercise of what Parliament has left of the prerogative which remain unsolved. Can the King legislate for Crown Colonies which have no Parliamentary constitution in any fashion inconsistent with the common or statute law of England? From the expressions used by Lord Coke, it appears as though he would have doubted this. But in Lord Coke's time there was but little territory governed directly by the Crown apart from the United Kingdom. Such problems are not easy of solution.

Indeed, with the development of the self-governing Dominions of the Crown it is not

always easy to understand why so much of the position of the King as practically as well as theoretically the supreme tribunal to which Dominion suitors may carry appeals has been allowed to remain in large measure intact. Canada recognizes the appeal and the right to bring it, especially in constitutional questions. The right is exercised there constantly. Australia has in the main abrogated this right in constitutional issues, but for ordinary civil questions she has left it practically intact. Perhaps one reason why the self-governing Dominions have abstained from claiming the uncontroverted title to dispose formally of their own legal disputes without permitting them to be brought here, is a change in the attitude of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council itself.

For a large number of the appeals that are brought before it special leave has to be obtained beforehand from the Committee. This is now almost always refused in questions of criminal law, and it is not given unrestrictedly in civil cases. The practice varies with the stage in self-development reached in the part of the Empire concerned. In the case of appeals from India, where there is no Central Court of Appeal, and in that of appeal from a Crown Colony, leave is given in sub-

stantial cases fairly freely. But if leave is sought to appeal from the Supreme Courts of Appeal in Canada or Australia it is different. Such leave is refused unless the question raised is one of great public interest, or involves some far-reaching principle of jurisprudence. As to South Africa, which has a unitary government and a Court of Appeal for the entire Dominion, leave to appeal is allowed but sparingly.

In all these instances the practice of the Judicial Committee has become, in material respects, modified as the relation of the particular part of the Empire to the mother country has been varied by the development of the self-government of the former. Political considerations are to this extent taken into account. One reason which enables this to be done is the experience of the Judges of the Judicial Committee. The majority of these are members of the House of Lords, where their duty is to be cognizant of changes in the political relations of the countries which constitute the Empire. The Statesman is required as well as the Judge, if the proper balance in judicial interference is to be observed. The Governments of Canada, of Australia and New Zealand, of South Africa, know that at any moment they

could stop the system of appeal to the King in Council, and of this they are kept reminded. They are in consequence not only willing, but, as far as the balance of testimony shows, anxious that the system, thus sparingly recognized, should go on. It is convenient to have as the tribunal of ultimate resort a body which is detached and impartial, and which yet administers the law of the particular Dominion and administers it with the large outlook which is the result of having to take cognizance of systems of jurisprudence of varying natures. Within a single fortnight the Judicial Committee sometimes has to hear appeals concerned with laws that are Buddhist, Hindhu, Mohammedan, French, Roman-Dutch, and, when the appeal comes from the Channel Islands, founded on the old custom of Normandy. But, of course, a large number of the controversies turn on the English common law.

Such a judicial system is probably unique in the history of the world, and it could only have survived under a Constitution which has been throughout unwritten and continuously adapting itself to new requirements. One result of the changes which are taking place within the Empire is that the judicial business of the Privy Council is tending to grow and

not to diminish. As native territories are becoming organized under new local governments their jurisprudence is assuming a more crystallized form. Custom is turning itself into law with the aid of Crown ordinances. The outcome is litigation in the local Courts, giving rise to appeals to the Sovereign in Council. Some of the questions thus raised, for example in West Africa, are of exceptional difficulty because of the novelty of the customs embodied in the native laws, which are highly divergent from the common law traditions of this country. These controversies, however, have to be dealt with in London, for they are being more and more frequently raised, especially in connection with the native family title to territory.

But litigation between private persons is far from being the only form of dispute which comes before the Privy Council for decision. Under the Privy Council Act of William IV there is power given to the Crown to refer to the Committee more general controversies of almost unrestricted kinds. The result has been that, from the Dominions, questions of a general and abstract nature are constantly being argued before it. Has the Dominion Parliament of Canada power, under section 91 of the British North America Act of 1867,

to pass legislation dealing with a certain subject matter, or is the particular power given, under section 92, to the Provincial Legislatures of Canada? How ought a boundary to be drawn between two Provinces of the Dominion? On what terms is the Dominion Government entitled to take over compulsorily the interests of the shareholders in a Canadian railway? These are topics of a kind that is referred to the Committee for decision under the powers just referred to. From Australia such issues come less frequently because of the restrictive provision inserted in the Commonwealth (Imperial) Act of 1900. And the Committee can never know beforehand what question it may be asked to decide. It is a convenient tribunal for the decision of matters in controversy of this sort because of its very remoteness, and its genuine unwillingness to claim jurisdiction has given it a certain popularity all over the Empire.

A great Privy Council Judge, such as was Lord Cairns, Lord Selborne or Lord Watson, is always esteemed throughout the Empire. The very political experience of such men has added to their value. It is a paradox, but a very real truth, that their training as politicians has made them the better judges

for such a Court. Only under an unwritten Constitution, the influence of which pervades the Empire and holds it in unison, could such a curious result have emerged. We are far away here from the Continental conception of a Judge as a mere interpreter of rigid codes.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is thus a real link between the Dominions and Colonies and the mother country. If it is little known to the man in the streets of the various cities which rule themselves under the ægis of the Sovereign, it has a long arm, and is a very real influence in smoothing the paths of Governments as well as of governed. It is impalpable. But few people, even of those who dwell in London, turn into Downing Street to see it sitting. And yet it is one of the King's Courts, and is open to every citizen of the Empire and to anyone else who chooses to walk in. There the visitor may see advocates of every shade of complexion, and with the most varying accents, pleading, or waiting to plead. A native King of a negro tribe is in evidence ; or a holy man from the Far East, come to superintend the suit brought by an idol to recover his temple, through his next friend who is responsible for the costs if the suit goes against the idol ; a farmer ; a gold

miner from British Columbia ; a French advocate from Quebec ; all of these may be there, confronting five elderly gentlemen, without wigs or robes, but seated round the horseshoe oaken table of the Judge, and with the marks of years of immersion in legal contemplation-written on their brows. It is indeed an unusual spectacle.

If the House of Lords is ever converted into a Senate, and its anomalous position as the Supreme Tribunal of Appeal for England, Scotland, and part of Ireland, is brought to an end, its jurisdiction will most probably revert to where it ought theoretically to be, the King in Council. This will make but little difference excepting in form. To-day the Judicial Committee sits in two divisions, one for the numerous appeals from India, and the other for appeals from the rest of the Empire. These divisions consist, when fully constituted, each of five judges, two of those who sit in the Indian division being usually ex-Indian Judges. In the House of Lords there sit five more, who, excepting that they must be Peers of the Realm entitled to sit there, are not distinguished from those who may sit in the Downing Street Court. The members who belong to the two tribunals are thus in the main interchangeable in

function, and the Judges who are Peers sit alternately in one Court or the other. The strength of the establishment required for the three divisions is thus fifteen, and provision is required of one or two extra in case of illness. Membership of the divisions is conditioned by the possession of qualifications prescribed by Statute.

There are six paid Law Lords, who receive £6,000 a year each, charged on the Consolidated Fund. There is the Lord Chancellor, and at present there are four effective ex-Lord Chancellors, who are paid what are called pensions of £5,000 each. It is a popular superstition that because the payment to an ex-Lord Chancellor is called a pension it is money which is not earned by continuous hard work. This is an error. The ex-Lord Chancellors sit just as regularly and do as much work as the six salaried Law Lords. Indeed, in addition to the ordinary work, they preside, in the absence of the Lord Chancellor, over the Court. They are bound, constitutionally and morally, to discharge these judicial duties, although for historical reasons the payment to them has been called a pension. Without them the country would be put to larger expense in replacing them by regularly appointed Judges.

It will be observed that the six Law Lords, with the Lord Chancellor and the four ex-Lord Chancellors, make up a total of eleven, while the three divisions of Judges required demand fifteen. The deficiency of four is made up by bringing in two ex-Indian Judges for appeals from India, and by inviting other ex-Judges, who have been made Privy Councillors, and are qualified under the provisions of the Statute, to sit, and to give their services voluntarily. A generous response has hitherto been made to this invitation by men who have finished distinguished careers of service to the State as Judges in the ordinary Courts. Lords Parmoor, Wrenbury, Phillimore and Salvesen have set aside other occupations in order to sit, and with their aid it has usually been possible to avoid a shortage in numbers. But the strain on the limited resources, which are all that are provided for the greatest Tribunal in the Empire, is often trying.

I have entered into these details in order to show how small will be the change in substance as distinguished from form of the Appellate jurisdiction if the House of Lords is ever restored to the Sovereign in Council. The Judicial Committee would, in such a case, sit in three divisions, each of five Judges, instead of in two divisions as at present, with

the groups constituted out of the same aggregate of qualified Judges as at present. All appeals would then lie to the King-Emperor in his Privy Council, as according to the principles of the Constitution they would lie naturally but for the usurpations in the days long over made by the legislature in the provinces of the Executive and the Judiciary. Such a transition to the older order of things would have this advantage, that it would occasion no disturbance to the traditions of the Dominions, or India, or the Crown Colonies.

How long the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will continue to exist as the link of Empire which it is to-day, and how long the distant parts of the world which are under the Constitutional rule of the British Crown will continue to regard the Committee as a Supreme Tribunal of ultimate appeal, it is not possible to predict. Probably some other of the Dominions will one day follow the example set by Australia in constitutional questions and decide to settle finally all of its own disputes in its own Courts. The process, if it commences, may be a rapid or a gradual one. On the other hand, the territories within the Empire which are in the early stages of their development may

continue their present tendency, which is to make a use more and more extended of the supreme tribunal of the Sovereign in Council. One has only to bear in mind the story of the variations in unwritten constitution between the different parts of the possessions of the Crown, and the evidence of continuous change in response to new requirements, which is everywhere taking place gradually and silently, in order to realize that prediction on the subject is futile. For the rest, all that can be said is that the jurisdiction appears to be at present generally recognized as a useful and convenient one, and that there is little real desire to disturb it on the part of the great majority of those concerned.

It is often complained of that a tribunal with Imperial functions of an order so important as those of the Judicial Committee should be housed in so mean a building as its present lodging. No doubt this would have been otherwise had the public taken much interest in the existence of the Court. And the public knows nothing of it, and the Press pays to it but scant attention. It is only when our fellow-subjects come over to us from across the seas that the old oak panelled room in Downing Street is thronged. Perhaps it is well that the attitude of the Treasury

towards the institution should have been one of strict niggardliness. The Judges can do their work most simply in the absence of display. If and when the change of which I have already spoken takes place, and the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords is added to the appellate jurisdiction of the King in Council, there will probably be a demand for a proper Court House and Library for the combined three divisions. Until that time comes they can afford to get through their work as they do at present.

It is in Canada and the Dominions, and in India and Ceylon and the Crown Colonies, that real interest is taken in the old Court House. They wonder there why over here we pay so little attention to what they think of so much. They do not realize what a silent, patient, unmovable burden-bearer the British citizen is by his nature. His Home Government resembles him. It does not stir until he stirs it, and even then not willingly. So it has been and so it probably will continue to be, and in the end this indisposition to move what is at rest has probably been one of the secrets of the cohesion of the Empire. We who sit as Judges in the Court have little cause to complain. Our work is of a delicate kind, and we are left in peace to do our best

to discharge tasks which are often difficult as well as delicate.

The tribunal has in its time had work to do of an equally delicate but of a different kind. As the Court of the Sovereign in his capacity of head of the Established Church of England, it has had to adjudicate about disputes over the law applying to doctrine and practice which Parliament has enacted since the Reformation. Bitterly contested issues as to Baptismal Regeneration, Eternal Punishment, and Ornaments and Incense have had to be dealt with in so far as the State has prescribed what was lawful within the Church which it has established. These judicial controversies probably now belong to the past, for Churchmen have been trying to avoid bringing them before a Court which must always be preponderatingly secular. But in earlier days the Judicial Committee has on several occasions saved the Church from apparent disruption by the weight of its arm. The Low Church party was protected in the Gorham case, the Broad Church party in that of the "Oxford Essays," and the High Church had security within limits assigned to their freedom within the Establishment by a series of decisions given later on. The time for these things appears to be now

over, but there may come a period when the historians of the Church will think more gently of the Judicial Committee than most of them do to-day, and will recognize in it the deliverer from the threat of disruption of a body suffering from the difficulties attending regulation and recognition by statute.

It is only what one might expect to find that a tribunal with such varied duties, and working in such an atmosphere, should have produced at times great personalities. Looking back over the interval since it was given its present form by the Act of William IV, the list of the names of its Judges contain those of a succession of impressive personalities. Lyndhurst, Brougham, Cottenham, Kingsdown, Campbell, Westbury, Hatherley, Parke, Willes, Cairns, Selborne, Blackburn, Watson, Hobhouse, Herschell, Macnaghten, Davey, are among the names in that list. The weight of their authority produced contentment with their decisions in the past, and it will go ill with the tribunal if at any time, by neglect, it is made to fail to attract sufficiently competent members.

But British Judges are not the only Judges who sit on it now. The Chief Justices of the Dominions have places in it, and others of the Dominion Judges sit there from time to

point of view as is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It is hopeless to search for the secret of such success as it has had merely in printed documents. For it is not in the written letter that the description of the real nature of the Court is to be found. The true description can only be given by those who, living here or coming from afar, have been in daily contact with the working of this extraordinary organization, and have experienced the extent to which it is continuously seeking to adapt its life to the needs which it has to fulfil as a link between the parts of this Empire.

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